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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW HEDGE FUND
ACTIVISM: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
THOMAS W. BRIGGS*
Hedge funds are not “normal” institutional investors. They launch
proxy fights for corporate control. Their recent successes and “wolf pack”
tactics have garnered headlines, but leave us with a question: what does
hedge fund activism mean for corporate governance in the United States?
This Article undertakes a legal, empirical, and theoretical study in an effort
to answer this question. The heart of the Article is an empirical study of
obtainable instances of hedge fund activism during 2005 and the 2006 proxy
season. The Article starts by showing that the SEC opened the door to
hedge fund activism when it stopped censoring most proxy material in 1992
and started allowing proxy “free communication” in 2000. The Article’s
empirical survey found nearly 50 instances of hedge fund activism, and also
found the in terrorem effect of these examples to be considerable. The
survey further found that the combination of “wolf pack” tactics and the
increasing influence of activist proxy advisory firms (the recommendations
of which many institutional investors follow automatically) have made
hedge fund activists a real power in corporate governance. Despite some
claims that hedge funds often hold short positions or are otherwise
dangerously conflicted, the survey only found very limited evidence for this;
the survey also found that hedge funds have, in fact, disclosed these
conflicts, though the proxy and Williams Act rules in this respect should be
clarified. The Article then subjects these results to theoretical analysis
using current nexus of contracts, shareholder primacy, director primacy,
team production, connected contracts and other theories and finds none
completely satisfactory. The Article concludes that an almost unprincipled
balance-of-power political model best explains the hedge fund activism
phenomenon. In the end, if these activities cause managements to review
and reassess their strategies, corporate governance is improved.
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INTRODUCTION
After an absence of over a decade, shareholder activism is once again a
hot topic,1 but this time with a difference. Back in the early 1990s, the focus
was on institutional investors and whether they could step in and help keep
corporate managements in line after hostile takeovers had fizzled a few
years earlier.2 Now “hungry” hedge funds with outsized war chests and
egos to match are said to be the “new raiders,” or even the “new sheriffs of
the boardroom.”3 While hedge funds openly posture and threaten, lawyers
1

See, e.g., K.A.D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. L. 219, 222
& n.11 (2005) (commenting that “[i]nstitutional investors were last a hot topic in the late
1980s and early 1990[s]” and providing a brief literature summary). The author’s views on
early 1990s shareholder activism are set forth in Thomas W. Briggs, Shareholder Activism
and Insurgency Under the New Proxy Rules, 50 BUS. LAW. 99 (1994).
2

A representative article on this topic is perhaps Bernard S. Black, Shareholder
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990) (better institutional monitoring would
likely happen if legal restrictions on shareholders were loosened). But by the late 1990s,
Professor Black had acknowledged that his hopes for the role that institutional monitoring
could play in corporate governance were all but dashed. See Bernard S. Black, Institutional
Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459 (Peter Newman ed. 1998) (low institutional
activism efforts produce commensurately low results).
3

See Mara Der Hovanesian, Attack of the Hungry Hedge Funds, BUS. WK., Feb. 20,
2006, at 72; Allan Murray, Hedge Funds Are the New Sheriffs of the Boardroom, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 14, 2005, at A2; Emily Thornton, The New Raiders, BUS. WK., Feb. 28, 2005, at 32. See
also Andrew Ross Sorkin, To Battle, Armed with Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006, at C1
(“[T]oday corporate boards are adjusting to a new reality: the activist investor, armed with a
handful of shares and a megaphone, is changing corporate America and the deal-making
landscape”).
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and consultants for corporations send their clients memoranda with titles
like The New Crisis and (in plainer English) Be Prepared For Attacks by
Hedge Funds.4 Some even believe that managements and these new activist
shareholders are battling for corporate America.5
This battle is occurring now for three principal reasons. First, in the
past few years, hedge funds have attracted an enormous amount of capital at
the same time that returns in their traditional, lower-profile strategies have
stagnated.6 Hedge funds now invest well over a trillion dollars,7 and all that
money has to go somewhere. Their investors, moreover, generally expect
market-beating or even absolute returns in exchange for the hefty fees most
hedge funds charge.8 The pressure to perform is on. And yet hedge fund
4
Compare Justin Hibbard, Take Your Best Shot, Punk, BUS. WK., Nov. 7, 2005, at 118
(quoting hedge fund manager as saying, “We’re putting together a war machine . . . [and] no
company will be safe”), with Martin Lipton et al., Memorandum to Clients, Be Prepared For
Attacks By Hedge Funds (Dec. 21, 2005) (“Expose the attackers for what they are, selfseeking, short-term speculators looking for a quick profit at the expense of the company and
its long-term value.”), available at http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/pdfs/wlrk12220502.pdf. See also Bryan Armstrong, The New Crisis: Shareholder Activism (2005), http://
www.ashtonpartners.com/default.aspex?pageID=79; David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh,
Advice on Coping with Hedge Fund Activism, N.Y.L.J., May 25, 2006, at 5.
5
See Battling for Corporate America, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11-17, 2006, at 69 (asking,
“Who will come out on top in the renewed struggle between shareholders and managers?”).
6
See, e.g., William Fung, David A. Hsieh, Narayan Y. Naik & Tarun Ramadorai,
Hedge Funds: Performance, Risk and Capital Formation, at 2 (SSRN Working Papers, Feb.
11, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=778124 (providing evidence that “even successful funds
have experienced a recent, dramatic decline in risk-adjusted performance”); Erin E.
Arvedlund, Easing the Sting, BARRON’S, Jan. 30, 2006, at 46 (Burton Malkiel noting that
hedge fund performance appears to have entered “an era of single-digit returns”); Susan
Pulliam & Martin Peers, Once a Lone Wolf, Icahn Goes the Hedge-Fund Route, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 12, 2005, at A1 (“The quick profits that hedge funds seek are harder to come by now,
partly because they’ve exploded in number, resulting in far more savvy investors on the prowl
and thus fewer undiscovered values.”); Henry Sender, Hedge Funds: The New Corporate
Activists, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2005, at C1 (noting that traditional passive strategies no
longer work so “instead of just taking bets on the outcome of others’ moves, [hedge funds]
themselves are becoming the catalyst for change in the corporate world.”); Thorns in the
Foliage, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1-7, 2006, at 61 (noting that “these days it is becoming harder for
hedge-fund managers to make money”).
7
See Lauren Etter, Volatile Markets Bring Hedge Funds Under Fire, WALL ST. J., July
1-2, 2006, at A9; Hedge Funds: Growing Pains, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4-10, 2006, at 63.
8
See Steve Fishman, Get Richest Quickest, N.Y. MAG., Nov. 22, 2004, at 28 (article
subtitled “In the precarious hedge-fund bubble, it’s either clean up – or flame out.”). Hedge
fund fees vary considerably, but often consist of a management fee of up to 2% per year plus a
performance fee of 20% or more of profits; mutual fund fees are often 1% with no
performance fee. See id.; see also Jenny Anderson, For Hedge Funds, Life Just Got a Bit
More Complicated, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at C8 (mutual fund fees average 1.4%);
Growing Pains, supra note 7, at 64; John Waggoner, Managed Funds Top S&P 500 Index
Again, USA TODAY, Jan. 4, 2006, at D1.
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industry returns were hardly better than flat in 2004 and amounted to not
much more than a market index return in 2005.9 According to one
knowledgeable observer, some funds are consequently “turning to activism
because it is getting tougher to show top-notch returns as more hedge funds
pursue similar investment ideas and overall market volatility drops.”10
Second, in our post-Enron, post-Sarbanes-Oxley world, there may be a
greater willingness on the part of investors to hold underperforming
managements to account.11 And third, as this Article will show, recent legal
reforms and court decisions have largely deregulated proxy contests and
other shareholder insurgency activities so as to make hedge fund attacks
easier and cheaper.12
Meanwhile, another more complicated battle is taking place, this time
among academic commentators and the corporate community. The issue is
the role shareholders (including hedge funds) play in corporate governance.
Lined up on one side are those who believe that shareholders actually own
corporations and should have a greater say in how they are run.13
9
See Growing Pains, supra note 7; see also Jenny Anderson, Atop Hedge Funds,
Richest of the Rich Get Even More So, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at C1, 22 (citing “less than
stellar” recent hedge fund performance and noting John Bogle’s acid comment that “[y]ou
would think someone would be a little embarrassed taking all that money for humdrum
returns”). Of course hedge fund returns are self-reported and leave some wondering about the
accuracy of published results. See Floyd Norris, Are These Hedge Fund Results Real?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 2006, at C1 (summarizing recent research).
10
Gregory Zuckerman, Big Shareholders Are Shouting Ever Louder, WALL. ST. J.,
Nov. 23, 2005, at C1.
11
See Riva Atlas, Some Funds Taking Role Far Beyond Just Investor, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 2006, at C1 (view that “[i]n the wake of corporate scandals and passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is harder for companies to ignore shareholders’ views”); Charles M.
Nathan & Erik A. Lopez Sr., Hedge Funds and M&A – New Sharks and Too Little Shark
Repellant, in 2 37TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 11, 44 (PLI Corp. L. &
Prac. Handbook Ser. No. 1517, 2005) (“In this post-scandal decade, the overall mood is
oriented toward rooting out corporate misdeeds, an aim which activist hedge funds frequently
purport to be seeking.”); Pulliam & Peers, supra note 6 (Carl Icahn’s view that “there has been
a sea change in investor attitudes concerning the role of entrenched corporate managements”
and that shareholders now “want to hold them accountable.”). Thornton, supra note 3, at 32
(“In the wake of Enron and other scandals, companies have never been as vulnerable to
shareholder demands as now.”).
12

See infra Part I.

13
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1784 (2006); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833 (2005); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS.
LAW. 43 (2003). See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a
Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 832 (1999) (noting
that “[m]ost (although by no means all) corporate scholars subscribe to the norm of
shareholder primacy, under which the objective of the corporation’s management should be to
increase shareholder wealth”).
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Shareholders, according to this view, should have direct input in selecting
director candidates and even in making other major corporate decisions
when directors are not up for election. Against them stand those who
distrust shareholders (perhaps especially including hedge funds) and believe
that companies are best run by directors who supervise professional
managers.14 Many in the corporate community stand somewhere in the
middle of all this, and appear largely to favor the status quo.15 Their
argument points to the modus vivendi constructed by the Delaware courts a
generation ago in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.16 and its progeny
and basically amounts to if-it-isn’t-broken-don’t-fix-it. In any event, the
fundamental question seems to be whether hedge fund activism will
accomplish little but generate headlines and disappear like the hostile
takeover boom of the 1980s or whether hedge funds can positively influence
corporate managements and thereby play a real, lasting and useful role in
American corporate governance.17
This Article contributes to this debate by examining in detail how hedge
fund activism actually happens and whether it betters corporate governance.
Part I reviews the recent legal history of shareholder activism and examines
why this past year, according to one leading proxy solicitation firm,
“marked the emergence of hedge funds as a force to be reckoned with in
election contests and mergers.”18 Part II presents a comprehensive
empirical survey of what hedge funds are, in fact, doing and examines how
they are doing it. Have the new hedge fund barbarians sacked corporate
14
See, e.g, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 547 (2003);
Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV.
561 (2006).
15
Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests In the Company’s Proxy:
An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67 (2003); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a
True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving
Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Corporate
Democracy: What It Is, What It Isn’t, and What It Should Be, INSIGHTS, Mar. 2006, at 20.
16

493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (imposing a higher, “reasonable in relation to the threat
posed” standard of judicial scrutiny in cases reviewing director conduct in takeover
situations).
17
See Hedge Fund Activism (May 27, 2005), ProfessorBainbridge.com, http://www.
profesorbainbridge.com/2005/05/hedge_fund_acti.html (“Are hedge funds the next big thing
in corporate governance, solving the principal-agent problems inherent in that governance
structure . . . [o]r will they fizzle out the way hostile takeovers and, to a lesser extent,
institutional investor activism have?”).
18
Georgeson Shareholder, Annual Corporate Governance Review 4 (2005), available at
www.georgesonshareholder.com/pdf/2005_corpgov_review.pdf.
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Rome or are they merely diligent and useful tillers of the corporate
governance soil? Part III explores the implications of the findings presented
in Part II, analyzes whether hedge funds are a problem that needs to be
fixed, and presents a modest proposal for regulatory reform. Part IV then
shows how hedge funds do not fit into present-day corporate governance
theories and develops a new theory based on a balance-of-power analysis.
The Article concludes, as some argued a decade ago in the early days of
investor activism, that politics has indeed come to the world of corporate
governance19 and that hedge fund activists are having a far greater impact
than their absolute numbers might suggest.
I. THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM TODAY
To begin with, there is no legal or even generally accepted definition of
a “hedge fund.” According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, a
hedge fund is any privately offered “entity that holds a pool of securities”
or other assets and that is not a registered mutual fund.20 Perhaps many
people simply think of hedge funds as secretive, aggressive, anything-goes
investors.21 For purposes of this Article, the term includes plain vanilla
hedge funds as well as other, “fellow traveling” funds with a similarly
aggressive activist investment style. But for any investor, SEC and related
rules form a veritable slalom course that must be run in any proxy fight or
other shareholder activism effort. These rules have essentially been
reworked twice in recent years, first in 1992 with the avowed purpose of
making traditional large-institution activism easier, and then again near the
turn of the millennium to streamline merger and acquisition transactions.
As the following pages will describe, however, the surprising consequences
of these changes for hedge fund activism have only recently become fully
apparent. Two of the changes, the termination of SEC proxy censorship and
the free-communication rule adopted in 1999, have essentially
revolutionized proxy fights and made hedge fund activism as we know it
19
See, e.g., John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1994); John Pound, Beyond Takeovers: Politics
Comes to Corporate Control, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 83. For a cogent rebuttal,
see Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Finance, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1997).
20
See SEC Staff Report, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 3 (2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment.shtml; see also Goldstein v. SEC,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 93,890, at 90,608 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2006) (“‘Hedge
funds’ are notoriously difficult to define.”); What’s in a Name?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4-10,
2006, at 64 (“The label ‘hedge fund’ is getting fuzzier by the day”).
21

See, e.g., Amey Stone, Hedge Funds Are Everyone’s Problem, BUS. WK. ONLINE,
Aug. 6, 2004, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/aug2004/nf2004086_0880_db
042.htm (calling hedge funds “souped-up speculative trading vehicles”).
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today possible.
A. The SEC Rules and the 1992 Reforms
Absent an available exemption, any shareholder “solicitation”
automatically invokes the full panoply of the SEC’s proxy rules.22 These
rules define a “solicitation” as any communication to shareholders “under
circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement,
withholding or revocation of a proxy.”23 This is a facts-and-circumstances
test. Even the SEC has acknowledged that what constitutes a solicitation is
therefore “not always clear,” and that “almost any statement of views” could
expose a shareholder to litigation risk.24 Cautious lawyers consequently
advise their clients accordingly.
Complying with the rules means filing a proxy statement and card in
preliminary form with the SEC for review by the staff.25 Once all comments
are cleared, the shareholder is free to mail its materials to all or as many
other shareholders as it wishes.26 Identifying these other shareholders and
coping with the truly Byzantine complexity of actually reaching them
through brokerage firm and other Wall Street back offices27 in turn
necessitates hiring a financial printer and a professional proxy solicitation

22
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (2006); Regulation of Communications Among
Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 85,051 (Oct. 16, 1992) (adopting the 1992 reforms).
23

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l) (2006). See Exchange Act Release No. 5276, [1952-1956
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,380 (Jan. 17, 1956) (original adopting release
for the current proxy rules) (explaining that “statements made for the purpose of inducing
security holders to give, revoke, or withhold a proxy . . . by any person who has solicited or
intends to solicit proxies . . . may involve a solicitation within the meaning of the regulation,
depending upon the facts and circumstances”). Much has been written on “solicitation.” See,
e.g., RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY
CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL § 5.02 (3d ed. 1998); Briggs, supra note 1, at 103-110
(collecting authorities).
24

Release No. 31,326, supra note 22, at 83,358; Exchange Act Release No. 30,849,
[1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,002, at 83,358 (June 24, 1992).
25

17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3(a) & -6 (2006).

26
Unlike companies, which have to mail to everyone, shareholders can generally mail
to as many shareholders as seems tactically expedient. See Release No. 31,326, supra note 22,
at Part II.D.
27
In the context of proxy voting, these complexities have only recently begun to attract
serious study and attention. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying:
Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 SO. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006); Shaun
Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775.
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firm, which only adds to the legal expenses already incurred.28 But from
here things get easier. After distributing the proxy statement, nothing else
that an insurgent sends out has to be precleared with the SEC, as had been
the case before the 1992 reforms.29 According to the adopting release, the
SEC got itself out of the proxy censorship business because it believed that
contestants “should be free to reply to [an opponent’s] statement in a timely
and cost-effective manner, challenging the basis for the claims and
countering with their own views on the subject matter through the
dissemination of additional soliciting material.”30 This change has proved
to be revolutionary. Restrained only by the general proxy antifraud rule,31 a
hedge fund activist is now free to disseminate to the world near telephone
books full of essentially unverifiable presentation slides.
There are two genuinely useful exemptions from these rules, the ten-orfewer rule32 and the free-speech rule adopted as part of the 1992 reforms.33
The ten-or-fewer rule allows a contestant to solicit freely up to ten other
shareholders without filing anything with the SEC, and can be extremely
valuable in the early stages of getting an insurgency campaign off the
ground. In situations where ownership is fairly concentrated, this first effort
can sometimes even prove determinative.34 The free-speech rule allows an
insurgent to solicit an unlimited number of holders without filing anything
with the SEC except a copy of any written materials.35 The insurgent must
use management’s proxy card and generally cannot have an intent to engage
in a proxy solicitation for the election of directors or any other “control
28

See Constance E. Bagley & David J. Berger, PROXY CONTESTS AND CORPORATE
CONTROL, at A-5 to A-11, B-101 (2001) (BNA Corp. Prac. Ser. No. 70).
29

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) & (b) (2006).

30

Release No. 31,326, supra note 22, at 83,365.

31

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2006).

32

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(2) (2006).

33

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (2006); Release No. 31,326, supra note 22. Until 2000,
another useful exemption permitted limited early communications in contests. See Regulation
of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications, Securities Act Release No. 7760, 64 Fed.
Reg. 61,408 (Nov. 10, 1999) (rescinding former Rule 14-11(b)); Briggs, supra note 1, at 14142.
34
On one recent occasion an insurgent was able to win a contested vote on a ten-orfewer basis alone. See American Building Control, Inc., Schedule 13D (June 21, 2004);
Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 22, 2004) (filings reflecting replacement of company
chairman in contested election). The author represented the shareholder in this situation. See
also Crouch v. Prior, 905 F. Supp. 248 (D.V.I. 1995) (preliminary injunction granted for
soliciting over ten shareholders); Briggs, supra note 1, at 102-10 (detailed analysis).
35

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-103 (2006) (form of “Notice of Exempt Solicitation”).
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transaction.”36 Nevertheless, the rule enables an insurgent to run an
inexpensive campaign for or against any management or shareholder
proposal appearing on management’s proxy card.37 Hedge fund activists
principally use the rule to attack unwanted mergers.
The remaining useful proxy reform is the “short slate” rule.38 Although
rarely used, the rule permits a dissident to run a slate of fewer directors than
there are seats up for election.39 A shareholder simply sends out a proxy
card naming its own nominees plus those management nominees for whom
it will not vote, thereby casting a vote for all available seats.40 The strategic
thought here is that running a short slate permits a less confrontational,
constructive engagement with management while at the same time seeming
less risky and therefore more attractive to an institutional voting base.
Apart from the proxy rules, the other regulatory hurdle facing a wouldbe insurgent is the SEC’s Schedule 13D and its accompanying rules.41 The
two main issues are the “group” issue and the “intent” issue. Corporate
defense lawyers will first look here for litigation fodder.42
These rules require the filing of an ownership report on Schedule 13D
within ten days after the acquisition of five percent or more of a company’s
stock.43 Any two or more persons will be considered one aggregated filing
group if they have agreed to act together “for the purpose of acquiring,
36
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(2) (2006); Release No. 31,326, supra note 22, at 83,360-62.
The insurgent, moreover, must use management’s actual proxy cards, not reprints. See
MONY Group, Inc. v. Highfields Capital Mgmt., L.P., 368 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (SEC staff
disagreement with this result).
37

See Release No. 3126, supra note 22, at 83,358 & 83,364-65.

38

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d) (2006).

39

See Meredith M. Brown et al., TAKEOVERS: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS, at 6-142 to -44 (2d ed. 2004) (brief review); Charles I. Cogut, William E.
Curbow & Patrick E. King, Short Slates, 28 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 79 (1995)
(comprehensive analysis).
40
See Ronald J. Gilson, Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, How the Proxy Rules
Discourage Constructive Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a Minority of
Directors, 17 J. CORP. L. 29 (1991) (article that led to adoption of short slate rule).
41

See Regulation 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 to -7 (2006); Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d-101 (2006). These rules and the cases applying them are comprehensively analyzed
in Briggs, supra note 1, at 111-26.
42

See 1 Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & Alexander R. Sussman, TAKEOVER DEFENSE § 11.02
(6 ed. 2004) (subsection entitled “Suing an Accumulator”); Be Prepared for Attacks By
Hedge Funds, supra note 4 (advising clients to be prepared to litigate group and intent issues).
th

43
The filing rules are succinctly summarized in Thomas R. Stephens, BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP REPORTING: SCHEDULES 13D AND G (2003) (BNA Corp. Prac. Ser. No. 68).
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holding, voting or disposing” of the shares.44 And “holding” or “voting”
most assuredly include the concept of threatening to vote.45 The agreement
in any event need not be in writing, may be informal and may be inferred
from circumstantial evidence. The real-world problem most frequently
encountered here is determining when discussions among shareholders
about influencing company strategy or the make-up of management ripen
into a disclosable agreement to form a group. The cases are legion, and
generally leave even the most knowledgeable lawyers wondering where
exactly to draw the line for their clients.46
Still more cases concern the “intent” issue. Schedule 13D calls for the
disclosure of any “plans or proposals” concerning an entire laundry list of
corporate events, including mergers or other extraordinary corporate
transactions, changes in the board of directors or management, asset sales or
anything else similar to the enumerated items.47 Any material change in
these plans then requires the “prompt” filing of an updating amendment to
the Schedule.48 Again, the real-world problem most frequently encountered
is determining when brain storms, mere suggestions and other preliminary
ideas ripen into disclosable plans or proposals. The cases here, too, are
legion.49 Perhaps the safest conclusions are that a shareholder must
absolutely disclose all definitive plans and that any undisclosed plans had
better not show up in the garb of outwardly seeming definitiveness when
discovery occurs and depositions are taken.
B. The Turn-of-the-Millennium Changes
Although these proxy and Schedule 13D rules remain with us today,
several important changes over the past few years have operated to blunt
their regulatory impact and help fuel the recent surge of hedge fund
activism. Judicial decisions have also contributed to these developments as
the courts have continued to work through applying precedents largely
44

17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b) (2006).

45

See Briggs, supra note 1, at 112-17.

46

See id. (comprehensive analysis); infra at text accompanying notes 59-66 (update).

47

See Schedule 13D, Item 4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Item 4 (2006); Briggs, supra
note 1, at 121-26; Albert J. Li, The Meaning of Item Four of Schedule 13D of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: A New Framework and Analysis, 52 BUS. LAW. 851 (1997).
48

17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (2006).

49
See Briggs, supra note 1, at 121-26 (comprehensive analysis); see also Azurite Corp.
v. Amster & Co., 52 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1995) (confirming that mere preliminary plans do not
require disclosure); Independent Fed. Sav. Bank v. Bender, 332 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C.
2004) (same).
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developed during the take-over boom of the late 1970s and 1980s to the
more ordinary rough-and-tumble of shareholder activism.
By far the most important change, really a revolutionary change, was
the addition in late 1999 of a new Rule 14a-12 to the proxy rules as part of
the promulgation of Regulation MA for take-over transactions.50 So long as
no proxy card is furnished, Rule 14a-12 effectively allows unlimited
solicitations before any proxy statement is filed. Written materials must be
filed with the SEC upon their first use, must disclose all the participants in
the proxy solicitation and their shareholdings, and must contain prescribed
legends. Oral communications, according to the adopting release, are also
freely permitted and “do not need to be reduced to writing and filed.”51 Of
course, a participant must truly intend to prepare and disseminate a proxy
statement.52 But if the solicitation is abandoned, there never will be any
proxy statement.53 (Cynics might detect a wink here.) It also goes without
saying that a proxy participant can send all this information out to
shareholders and the press.54 By the time an actual proxy statement is
finally ready to mail, more than a few fights will already be practically over
or settled entirely.55
A proposed modernization of the proxy statement delivery rules should
in any event make it much easier and cheaper to follow through to a finish
any proxy fight that does not settle, and may prove equally revolutionary.56
50
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-12 (2006); Release 7760, supra note 33 (adopting release).
See also Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications, Securities Act
Release No. 7607, 67 Fed. Reg. 67,331 (Dec. 4, 1998) (proposing release).
51

See Release 7760, supra note 33, at 61,414.

52

See SEC Division of Corporation Finance: Manual of Publicly Available Telephone
Interpretations, at Part I.D, Question No. 3, http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone/phone
supplement3.htm (3d Supp. July 2001) (“In order to rely on Rule 14a-12, soliciting parties
must intend to furnish a proxy statement to security holders.”).
53

See Release 7760, supra note 33, at 61,415 (“[P]arties relying on the rule are not
obligated to furnish a written proxy statement if the solicitation is discontinued for any
reason.”).
54

Release 7607, supra note 50, at 67,340. See also Eugene F. Cowell III, Internet
Technology Permits New Proxy Contest Techniques, INSIGHTS, Oct. 2001, at 17 (summarizing
internet distribution techniques under Rule 14a-12).
55
See Georgeson Shareholder, supra note 18, at 4 (noting decline in all-out proxy fights
“as management frequently decided to reach settlements with their dissident shareholders
rather than risk a full-scale battle”).
56
See Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 52,926, 70
Fed. Reg. 74,598 (Dec. 15, 2005) (proposing release); Ron Orol, SEC Readies New Proxy
Statement Rules, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 9, 2006, at 5 (noting that the proposal is “expected to be
adopted later this year”); see also Dennis O. Garris & Catherine A. Duke, SEC Proposes the
Use of the Internet for Proxy Solicitations, INSIGHTS, Jan. 2006, at 11, 14 (“[M]ost
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After moving the public offering regulatory regime under the Securities Act
to an internet-access-equals-delivery model last year,57 the SEC is likewise
moving the proxy disclosure system to a notice-and-internet-access model.
For a dissident shareholder, issuing a press release or simply emailing Rule
14a-12 material would constitute sufficient notice. “Thus,” according to the
SEC’s proposing release, a shareholder “could effect a widespread
solicitation of proxies without [actually] delivering any [n]otices at all,
provided that it does not furnish or provide a means of obtaining a proxy
card except on the Web site where its proxy materials are posted.”58
The SEC similarly streamlined the Schedule 13D rules in 1998 when it
added a new category of ordinary “passive” investors such as hedge funds to
those eligible to file an abbreviated disclosure statement on short-form
Schedule 13G.59 The principal benefits of the form over the longer
Schedule 13D are that it generally requires updating only once a year and
that it calls for no disclosure at all about an investor’s purpose or intentions;
contrariwise, a Schedule 13D has to be amended promptly for any material
change and requires detailed purpose and intent disclosure.60 The obvious
strategic benefit of using the short form Schedule 13G is that it allows for a
surprise attack: with no “purpose” disclosure and but once yearly
ownership disclosure, who other than the investor itself can really tell what
is going on until, as at Pearl Harbor, it is too late? The equally obvious flip
side to this question is when exactly does such an investor become nonpassive and so have to switch from a Schedule 13G to a Schedule 13D? The
SEC noted in its adopting release that such a determination can be “difficult
and fact intensive.”61 As a practical matter, however, it seems that merely
making suggestions to management about what it should be doing is
perfectly permissible, while seeking board representation, proposing an
importantly, the proposed rules will allow proxy solicitations to be waged by third parties at
virtually no cost to the third party.”); David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, A Seismic Shift in
Mechanics of Electing Directors, N.Y.L.J., July 27, 2006, at 5 (noting that dissident costs
would be “significantly diminished”).
57

See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722, at Part VI (Aug. 3, 2005).
58

Release No. 52,926, supra note 56, at 74,608.

59

See Amendments to Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements, Exchange Act
Release No. 39,538, 63 Fed. Reg. 2854 (Jan. 16, 1998). Note that such a passive investor’s
ownership level also has to be under 20%. Id.
60

If, however, an investor’s ownership exceeds 10%, additional Schedule 13G
amendments are required for any 5% change. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(d) (2006). The Schedule
13D amendment rule is at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (2006) and provides, among other things,
that a 1% change in an investor’s ownership level is material and thus requires an amendment.
61

Release No. 52,926, supra note 56, at 2859.
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acquisition or otherwise making threats are not.62
The courts have also contributed to streamlining the rules for hedge
fund activism. From a tactical point of view, the most important
development is their continued reluctance to find undisclosed groups lurking
amidst shareholders who merely talk to one another and have frank
exchanges of views about their investee companies. In Hallwood Realty
Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., for example, the Second Circuit
refused to find that two Schedule 13D filers and a Schedule 13G filer were a
group just because one was a known raider, two bought stock during the
same period, and all three discussed what to do about their investment.63
Based in part on Hallwood, a flurry of emails and even a joint slate of
directors were not enough to persuade another court that the investors had
formed a group.64 “Congress,” said the court, “did not intend for Section
13(d) to serve merely as an eleventh-hour bludgeon for managements
embroiled in proxy contests.”65 Decisions such as these have enabled hedge
funds to engage in “wolf pack” tactics against companies undeterred by a
fear of somehow magically becoming a group merely because they hunt
together and seek the same prey.66
These wolf packs, moreover, can often have an influence far out of
proportion to their actual shareholdings because of recent regulatory action
mandating responsible fiduciary proxy voting by institutional investors.
Another, more succinct name for this phenomenon might be the Rise of
62

Compare Egghead.com, Inc. v. Brookhaven Cap. Mgmt., Inc., 194 F. Supp. 232
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (summary judgment on passivity issue denied because of intense strategic
debates and seeking of possible board representation), with Transcon Lines v. A.G. Becker
Inc., 470 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (ruling that mere suggestions and discussions with
management about corporate policies do not constitute non-passive control purpose). See Karl
A. Groskaufmanis & Janet G. Gamer, Monitoring the Dance: An Assessment of the SEC’s
Regulation 13D-G Amendments, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISER, July-Aug. 1998, at 16, 18
(noting that suggesting a divisional spin-off is passive, but that if the same suggestion were
presented “as a demand by a substantial shareholder with the implicit (or explicit) threat to
rally other substantial shareholders on the same issue, it becomes a different analysis”).
63

286 F.3d 613 (2d Cir. 2002).

64

See meVC Draper Fisher Jurvetson Fund I, Inc. v. Millennium Partners, L.P., 260 F.
Supp. 2d 616, 631-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
65
66

Id. at 633.

See infra Part II.B.2. From the point of view of a management-side observer, “[t]his
form of parallel action, driven by numerous independent decisions by like-minded investors,
as opposed to explicit cooperation agreements among participants, has allowed hedge funds to
avoid being treated as a ‘group’ for purposes of Regulation 13D.” See Nathan & Lopez, supra
note 11, at 41. On the other hand, truly egregious flouting of the “group” rule could lead to
being on the wrong end of an SEC enforcement action. See John Joslyn, 83 SEC Docket 3127
(Oct. 26, 2004) (willful failure to file in proxy take-over scheme).
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Institutional Shareholder Services, or ISS for short. ISS got its start in the
late 1980s when the Department of Labor, which supervises pension funds,
ruled that “[t]he fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of
corporate stock includes the voting of proxies.”67 The SEC then joined the
party in early 2003 when it adopted rules mandating that registered
investment advisers vote proxies “in the best interest of clients” and that
registered mutual funds disclose both their proxy voting policies and how
they actually voted.68 As a practical matter, cost effective compliance has
meant hiring someone else to vote the shares, namely ISS. And ISS has a
distinctly activist bent.69 The firm’s current voting policies, for example,
support only the weakest kinds of poison pills, and only then if shareholders
ratify them within a year, and mandate voting against all board members of
all companies that deviate from this approach.70 More critically, in
contested board elections and other corporate disputes, ISS has become
increasingly willing to support dissident candidates and positions.71
ISS and its competitors have, in fact, become enormously influential
and have also helped weaken corporate defenses. Although it is difficult to
quantify ISS’s precise impact, a recent Business Roundtable survey
concluded that an average of 40% of its responding members’ shares were

67

29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2006) (1994 codification of policies previously issued less
formally in advisory letters).
68
See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2106, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003) (adopting Investment Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-6, 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2006)); Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting
Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188,
68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003) (adopting Investment Company Act Rule 30b1-4, 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.30b1-4 (2006), and related amendments to the applicable Investment Company Act
forms).
69

See Institutional Shareholder Services, ISS 2006 US Proxy Voting Guidelines
Summary, http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/US2006SummaryGuidelines.pdf (summary of voting
policies). By 2004 the then chairman of The Business Roundtable, a leading corporate
lobbying group, had become so frustrated with ISS’s perceived anti-corporate bias that he
urged the founding of a competitive alternative to ISS. “We have all seen,” he said, “the
increasingly hostile recommendations from existing proxy advisory firms who continue to
promote narrow interests at the expense of long-term shareholder value.” See Gretchen
Morgenson, Pfizer and the Proxy Adviser, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2006, at C1 (quoting Hank
McKinnell). But ISS is less active than it used to be. See J.P. Donlon, ISS Signals
Strengthened Standards, DIRECTORSHIP, March 2006, at 1, 9-10 (“ISS originally had a public
image of being an activist organization, but this isn’t so today.”).
70

See ISS Voting Guidelines, supra note 69, at 7; see also Institutional Shareholder
Services, ISS U.S. Corporate Governance Policy 2006 Updates 7 (2005), http://www.
issproxy.com/pdf/2006USPolicyUpdate.pdf.
71
See ISS Voting Guidelines, supra note 69, at 14 (proxy contest guidelines are case-bycase). Specific examples are given below, at infra Part II.B.2.
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owned by institutions that followed ISS voting recommendations.72 One
consultant has similarly noted that “[m]any firms, especially those that
practice purely quantitative or index investing, will vote in line with ISS’
recommendations . . . [while] some firms claim they vote on a case-by-case
basis but will always vote with ISS.”73 Getting a favorable ISS
recommendation is therefore frequently essential to victory.74 The ISS
voting guidelines and evolving shareholder views have also gone some way
to taking the sting out of corporate takeover defenses, including weakening
poison pills and destaggering boards so that all directors stand for election
every year.75 In short, the ISS phenomenon has furthered and encouraged
shareholder activism of all sorts, including especially hedge fund activism.76
72
See Detailed Comments of Business Roundtable on the “Proposed Election Contest
Rules” of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 28-29 (Dec. 22, 2003), http://www.
sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/brt122203.pdf. See also Robert D. Hershey, Jr., A Little
Industry With a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, § 3, at 6 (noting that
ISS recommendations affect the votes of “professional investors controlling $25 trillion in
assets – half the value of the world’s common stock”). ISS has begun to attract academic
attention as well. See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry (SSRN Working
Papers, July 27, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=902900 (detailed study and analysis).
73
Chris Kettmann, Predicting and Impacting the Proxy Vote 3 (2005), http://www.
ashtonpartners.com/default.aspx?pageID=79.
74

See infra Part II.B.2; see also Andrew R. Brownstein & Trevor S. Norwitz,
Shareholder Activism in the M&A Context, M&A LAW., June 2006, at 1, 3 (noting that ISS
“cannot be regarded as a neutral party” and that the “fusion of aggressive hedge fund activism
and the power of large institutional holders is a potent formula that can energize an activist
campaign”).
75
See Institutional Shareholder Services, 2005 Postseason Report: Corporate
Governance at a Crossroads 13-14 (2005), http://www.issproxy.com (subsection entitled
“Anti-takeover Measures Under Greater Scrutiny”); Nathan & Lopez, supra note 11, at 43
(noting that “[r]ecent hedge fund successes can also be traced to the weakening of targets’
takeover preparedness, as well as directors’ increased sensitivity in a time of perceived greater
vulnerability”). See also Elizabeth A. Ising, Company Proposals to Declassify Boards of
Directors, INSIGHTS Sept. 2005, at 21 (declassification in response to institutional shareholder
pressure); Victor I. Lewkow & Sarah G. ten Siethoff, The Embattled Poison Pill, INSIGHTS,
Apr. 2005, at 13. But it does not do to overstate this point. Among the universe of US public
companies tracked by ISS, as of year-end 2005 53% still had staggered boards and 35% had
poison pills, in each case a change of less than three percentage points from 2003. See Patrick
McGurn, New Players, New Proposals, New Challenges: 2006 Proxy Season Preview/2005
Review 18-20 (Jan. 11, 2006), http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/webcast/2006_01_11. A
recent study, moreover, has found that boards almost universally ignore even successful
corporate governance shareholder proposals anyway, with the partial exception only of
destaggering proposals. See Jason M. Loring & C. Keith Taylor, Empirical Study,
Shareholder Activism: Directorial Responses to Investors’ Attempts to Change the Corporate
Governance Landscape, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 321, 331 (2006).
76

ISS has also become significantly conflicted because it sells its activist-oriented
services to institutions (thus creating issues for corporate managements) and to corporations
(thus solving the issues created). See Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, [2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rev. (CCH) ¶ 78,845 (Sept. 15, 2004) (failing to
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Finally, a series of recent decisions by the Delaware courts, where most
public companies are incorporated,77 have preserved for hedge fund activists
the right to enjoy the fruits of electoral victory. Shareholders’ voting rights
occupy a special place in Delaware corporate law. The Delaware Supreme
Court recently confirmed in MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.78 the validity of
the strict Blasius79 “compelling justification” standard for board action taken
with the primary purpose of interfering with the effective exercise of
shareholders’ voting rights. Defensive tactics such as expanding the board
and filling the resulting vacancies on the eve of a proxy vote to dilute a
dissident’s franchise are consequently proscribed, as is adding a mid-proxycontest supermajority vote requirement to foil a dissident’s efforts to amend
the bylaws.80 Other Delaware decisions have effectively eviscerated the
anti-takeover effectiveness of the poison pill against proxy contests.81
The only discouraging word here is Sarbanes-Oxley.82 Finding
candidates willing to serve on a dissident slate has always been difficult, and
this bit of what Roberta Romano has called “quack corporate governance”
has not made this task any easier.83 The SEC’s implementing rules have
get a blanket waiver of these conflicts under the Investment Advisers Act). ISS’s power and
conflicts are attracting increasing notice. See, e.g., NYSE Proxy Working Group, Report and
Recommendations 29 (June 5, 2006), http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/REVISED/_NYSE_Report
_6_5_06.pdf (recommending formal SEC study of “the role these [proxy advisory] groups
play in the proxy voting process”).
77
See Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 167 (recent review and analysis).
78

813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).

79

Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). See David C.
McBride & Danielle B. Gibbs, Interference with Voting Rights: The Metaphysics of Blasius
Industries v. Atlas Corp., 26 J. CORP. L. 927 (2001) (comprehensive analysis).
80

See MM Cos., supra note 78 (new board vacancies); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771
A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000) (supermajority bylaw provision).
81
See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Co., 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998)
(invalidating poison pill that purported to delay dismantlement by new dissident directors);
Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) (effectively invalidating poison
pill that purported to disable dismantlement by new dissident directors forever). Delaware’s
validation of the director-adopted poison pill has in any event always been premised on the
ability of shareholders to elect directors of their own choosing, i.e., to run a proxy contest
unimpeded. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985). The
poison pill law in other states can be less friendly. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff,
Dead Hand Poison Pills and Recent Variations, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19, 1998, at 5 (Georgia and
Pennsylvania).
82
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
83

See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). See also Steven A. Seiden, Calling Those With
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also cast a dark shadow of non-“independence” over any candidate put up
by a holder of ten percent or more of a company’s stock.84 And as anyone
who has read this far no doubt already knows, “independence” is the key to
the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate governance city.85
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY AND REVIEW: HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM
All these legal changes have combined to open the door wide for a new,
more aggressive kind of shareholder activism, and hedge funds have
marched unhesitatingly through. The following pages examine what they
actually do and how they do it.86
A. Study Methodology
The methodology used is straightforward. Data for all 2005 (the first
year hedge fund activism received widespread notice) and the first eight
months of 2006 (both the cut-off for this Article and the unofficial end of
the proxy season) were hand-gathered from press reports and information
available from Institutional Shareholder Services and Georgeson
Shareholders.87 What is considered a “hedge fund” has already been
described.88 For purposes of the study, “hedge fund activism” is defined as
Fortitude: So You Need a Dissident Director, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 29 (finding
dissident director candidates); Barry Augenbraum, Should Directors Be Worried?, INSIGHTS,
Feb. 2005, at 21 (rhetorically asking why any executive would choose to serve on a public
company board and why any lawyer would advise such service “in today’s climate”).
84
See Standards Relating to Listed company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release
No. 8220, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) (adopting Rule 10A-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3
(2006), which provides that only ownership under 10% preserves independence). Others have
noticed this absurdity, too. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O.
Douglas – The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance,
30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 141 (2005) (observing that a corporation’s large stockholders
nonetheless have “the greatest incentive to assure” high compliance standards). But the New
York Stock Exchange’s listing standards have no such bright-line test. See N.Y. STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, at Rule 303A.02 & Commentary (2004),
http://www.nyse.com/lcm (noting that “as the concern is independence from management, the
Exchange does not view ownership of even a significant amount of stock, by itself, as a bar to
an independence finding”).
85
For a recent critical analysis, see Note, Beyond “Independent” Directors:
Functional Approach to Board Independence, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1553 (2006).
86

A

A summary of the data collected appears as the Appendix at the end of this Article.

87

See Georgeson Shareholder, Annual Corporate Governance Review, supra note 18;
Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., 2005 Postseason Report: Corporate Governance at a
Crossroads (2005), http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2005PostSeasonReportFINAL.pdf. See also
Patrick McGurn, supra note 75.
88

See supra text at notes 20-21.
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any actual or overtly threatened proxy contest or any other concerted and
direct attempt to change the fundamental strategic direction of any solvent
United States public corporation other than a mutual fund. For example,
any campaign using such phrases as value “maximization” or
“enhancement” is included; conversely, mere sponsors of corporate
governance shareholder resolutions are excluded.89 Once a situation was
identified, virtually every filing with the SEC by every participant was
reviewed to obtain details (which often remain under or unreported) about
the strategies and tactics used.90 While diligent efforts were used to identify
as many situations as possible, some have no doubt been missed. This is
likely especially true for situations involving smaller companies or sparser
press attention.
Although the data presented have not been deliberately “cherry picked”
for hedge fund success, unsuccessful activist efforts and campaigns
involving smaller companies inevitably garner less than their fair share of
attention. A campaign that gets no traction dies unnoticed. Some subjective
judgment is also involved here since every hopeful writer of a “Dear
Management” letter, who might get noticed in the weekly Barron’s write-up
of that week’s half-dozen or so “activist” Schedule 13D filers, can hardly be
said to have mounted anything resembling a real campaign. Nevertheless,
what follows is presented with the confidence that it at least is fairly
indicative of the kinds of strategies and techniques actually used by hedge
funds today. What these findings mean for corporate governance and
regulation will then follow.
B. The Findings: Hedge Fund Activism Today
Despite all the press and attention lavished on hedge fund activism and
its supposed evils and benefits, one of the most striking things about this
study’s findings is how rarely activist efforts became full public attacks. Of
the thousands of US public companies, only 49 seem to have become the
subject of a significant hedge fund campaign during the 20 months
examined. So whatever the eventual significance of hedge fund activism,
89
If sponsoring shareholder resolutions constituted activism, then even Harvard law
professors could be activists, as well as the usual run of labor unions, public pension funds and
full-time corporate gadflies. See Mark Maremont & Erin White, Stock Activism’s Latest
Weapon, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2006, at C1 (reviewing innovative shareholder-resolution-based
activist techniques used by Professor Lucian Bebchuk against eight public companies). See
also infra notes 200-205 and accompanying text (reviewing labor union, public pension fund
and individual activism through shareholder resolutions).
90

Essentially all public company filings are available, sorted chronologically by
company, through the SEC’s EDGAR search page. See http://www.sec.gov/edgar/search
edgar/webusers.htm.
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today it represents less a direct meaningful problem for management
America than an indirect sign of coming fundamental changes in United
States corporate governance.91
1. Free Communication
As intimated in the legal introduction above,92 the most striking
substantive finding is how Rule 14a-12’s “free communication” provisions
have transformed the hedge fund shareholder activism landscape. Of the 37
situations involving threatened or actual proxy or consent fights, the
dissidents used the rule for written communications in 29. The eight
remaining situations mostly involved either unusual circumstances such as a
hostile consent solicitation (where the surprise attack is the favored tactic), a
mainly verbal campaign against an unwanted merger or a fast settlement.93
The funds’ use of Rule 14a-12, moreover, has sometimes become so
extreme that an entire proxy contest has occurred without the filing of any
proxy statement at all, not even a preliminary one: Carl Icahn and the
management of Time Warner fought it out for six months on the basis of
Rule 14a-12 filings alone, finally culminating in an Icahn-led press
conference at the St. Regis hotel in New York and a 348-page book full of
supporting material presented by Icahn’s investment banker, the venerable
Bruce Wasserstein.94 After all this, Icahn retired to count the votes he likely
had, determined that they were not enough and threw in the towel after a
barely face-saving settlement of getting two new independent directors
added to the board and an increase in the company’s existing stock buy-back
program.95 How could all this happen, practically a whole proxy contest,
with no proxy statement? The second extreme Rule 14a-12 contest found in
the study, Relational Investors’ ten-month campaign against Sovereign
91

See infra Part IV.A. Cf. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, supra note 13,
at 1784 n.2 (describing numerically small instances of proxy fights for control).
92

See supra text at notes 50-55.

93

See, e.g., infra text at note 126 (settlement after consent solicitation at AirNet
Systems); infra, text at notes 98 and 132 (oral campaign against merger at MCI); infra text at
note 139 (fast settlement at Knight Ridder). Strangest of all was General Motors, where the
insurgent claimed it was passive and yet somehow managed to threaten a proxy contest
anyway to obtain a board seat. See Lee Hawkins, Jr., Kerkorian May Turn Up Heat on GM,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2005, at A3. For the tactics in consent solicitations, see Eric S.
Robinson, Defensive Tactics in Consent Solicitations, 51 BUS. LAW. 677 (1996).
94

See Matthew Karnitschnig, Icahn Ends Effort to Take Control of Time Warner, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 17, 2006, at A1 (summarizing contest); Time-Warner, Inc., Soliciting Material
Filed By Non-Registrant (Schedule 14A) (Dec. 7, 2005) (Icahn’s Rule 14a-12 filing of Bruce
Wasserstein’s 348-page presentation).
95

See Matthew Karnitschnig, Time Warner, Icahn Reach Accord, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1819, 2006, at A3.
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Bank, was at least conducted based in part on the filing of a preliminary
proxy statement.96
Two further and important aspects of the Rule 14a-12 phenomenon are
worth noting. First, months-long contests with all sorts of material being
distributed to shareholders ineluctably involve frequent and extensive
conversations with those being solicited. As described above, entire hotel
ball rooms full of shareholders can be addressed. Under Rule 14a-12, these
conversations remain essentially unregulated.97 The study found one
contest, Deephaven Capital Management’s unsuccessful attempt to block
the MCI-Verizon merger last year, where a hard-fought campaign appears to
have been based solely on oral communications.98 Second, with the SEC no
longer prescreening any of this material, sophisticated and one-sided
advocacy rules the day, as the SEC has evidently chosen to direct its
resources elsewhere.99 Certainly getting practically daily filings over a
period of months, let alone a 348-page financial presentation book, past the
SEC never would have happened on anything like a real-time basis before
the rules modernization.100
2. Activist Size, Wolf Pack Tactics and the Advisory Firms
After the near ubiquity of Rule 14a-12, the study’s next most interesting
finding is the size of the funds’ direct and indirect shareholdings. Of all the
situations reviewed, only five involved hedge fund activists with less than a
4.9% stake. Twenty-two activists had at least a 9.5% stake.101 A higher
96

See Jesse Eisinger, Sovereign Bancorp’s Takeover Deal Looks Like a Dis to
Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2005, at C1 (summary of contest, including Relational’s
preliminary proxy filing); David Enrich, Sovereign, Relational Crusaded Right Up to Their
Uneasy Truce, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2006, at C3 (describing settlement).
97

See supra text at note 51.

98
See Andrew R. Sorkin & Ken Belson, A Campaign to Derail Verizon-MCI Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2005, at C2. The insurgents never filed any written material under Rule
14a-12.
99

See supra text at notes 29-31.

100

See Regulation of Security Holder Communications, Exchange Act Release No.
29,315, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rev. (CCH) ¶ 84,811, at Part III.B.1 (June 17,
1991) (noting that both “management and insurgent groups alike have criticized
[preclearance] . . . as interfering unduly with effective communication with shareholders”).
For an authoritative account of the old pre-clearance procedures, see EDWARD R. ARANOW &
HERBERT A. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 138-59 (2d ed. 1968)
(superseded).
101

There is a reason many activists deliberately stay safely under 10%. Section 16 of
the Securities Exchange Act effectively makes short term trading with ownership over this
level impossible. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
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stake makes a bigger publicity megaphone and gives any campaign a good
start when it comes to counting votes. It also helps to have fellow, likeminded investors with still more shares. Three of the situations studied
show disclosed ownership by a handful of institutions of over half the
outstanding shares.102
Failing this kind of already locked-up vote, an activist can attract a
“wolf pack” of other hedge funds interested in the same prey but who are
careful not to form a Schedule 13D group.103 Precise data about wolf packs
are impossible to obtain since ungrouped holders do not have to disclose
anything, but at least several of the situations studied appear to have
involved these beasts. Thirteen involved either two or more mutually
supportive but separate Schedule 13D filers or other reported pack activity.
In the two-week long successful effort to force a sale at Knight Ridder, for
example, the company’s largest shareholder was joined just two days after
the announcement of its campaign by two other new Schedule 13D filers
with the same goal. What started out as a 19% stake effectively grew to
37% in just 48 hours. The campaign had already succeeded before it had
hardly begun.
From a purely legal point of view, it is especially noteworthy that two
of these packs produced a joint slate of directors while somehow avoiding
forming a group. This kind of close but non-group forming pseudocooperation would have been inconceivable in a prior era,104 and shows how
intimate shareholders can get without running afoul of the rules. Note, too,
that the company in the Bally proxy fight attempted to sue on this point in
both federal and state court, but to no avail.105
The Institutional Shareholder Services phenomenon described earlier106
102
It is also highly likely that there were many more than only three. Professional
proxy solicitors make part of their living by using the often stale and always difficult-tointerpret information provided by Form 13F reports under Rule 13f-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1
(2006), to estimate ownership by institutions that stay under the 5% level used for Schedule
13D, Schedule 13G and proxy statement disclosure purposes.
103

See supra text at notes 43-46 and 59-66.

104

Compare Briggs, supra note 1, at 137-38 (detailed legal analysis), with supra text at
note 64 (citing recent case appearing to allow joint slate).
105
See Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Liberation Invs., L.P., No. 05-841-JJF,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34897 (D. Del. Dec. 22, 2005) (denying motions for preliminary
injunction and expedited discovery in “group” proxy and Schedule 13D case); Bally Total
Fitness Holding Corp., Definitive Additional Materials (Schedule 14A) (Jan. 10, 2006) (text of
state court complaint attempting to use alleged “group” formation as poison pill trigger);
Definitive Additional Materials Filed By Non-Registrant (Schedule 14A) (Jan. 1, 2006) (two
filings on this date both describing court’s de facto rejection of suit).
106

See supra text at notes 67-76.
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appears to help add wolves to the pack. ISS backed the dissidents in twelve
proxy fights for board seats and the dissidents won eleven; ISS backed
management in three other contests, one of which the dissident also won.
Although its published proxy contest guidelines reflect a case-by-case
policy,107 in practice ISS thus appears more than willing to back dissidents.
When it does, they win. Or at least it has to help since whenever elections
are involved, every vote counts. Even if ISS’s evident policy of issuing a
recommendation only two weeks or so before a scheduled proxy vote means
that it misses most situations,108 its known leanings will inevitably influence
everything from pre-proxy value maximization campaigns to outright proxy
contest settlements. After all, how contestants think a vote will likely go
will inevitably drive their settlement decisions.
ISS’s earlier described indirect influence on antitakeover defenses109
also appears to have fatally weakened one of the predated companies in the
survey, Six Flags, Inc. The dissident in this contest was able mount a
consent solicitation to take over effective control of the board of directors
because the company’s charter failed to prohibit action by shareholder
written consent.110 Since only the shareholders can amend a charter, Six
Flags would have had to have had its shareholders vote to take away from
themselves the right to act by consent. ISS has a policy of always
recommending a vote against such a charter amendment.111 Current
investor sentiment these days also generally runs in the same direction. So
trying to fix the vulnerability would have been futile, and the company
remained open to an activist’s attack.
The object nevertheless remains to persuade, and it appears that hedge
fund activists are taking advantage of their opportunities in new ways. ISS
has come to be treated almost as sort of latter-day cross between Solomon
and the Pied Piper of Hamelin before which contestants make road-show
107

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.

108

This conclusion is drawn from the study data. Situations missed include settled
fights (if the contest stops early enough) and generic value enhancement or maximization
campaigns (no vote at all).
109

See supra text at notes 72-76.

110

See Six Flags, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement Filed By Non-Registrant (Schedule
14A) (Oct. 19, 2005). Section 228 of the Delaware General Corporation Law permits
shareholder action by written consent unless the charter specifically prohibits such action.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2001). Other “pure” shareholder solicitations in the survey
were directed against companies subject to Colorado and Ohio corporate law, which
statutorily give shareholders the right to call a special meeting, and against a New York
company with an old similarly permissive bylaw. See Computer Horizons, Inc., Definitive
Proxy Statement Filed By Non-Registrant (Schedule 14A) (Sept. 14, 2005).
111

See ISS Voting Guidelines, supra note 69, at 15.
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financial presentations and, in at least one instance, purely legal
arguments.112
Four activists in the survey took the essentially
unprecedented step of hiring high-profile investment bankers.113 And it
seems that sophisticated slide shows, duly filed with the SEC, have become
standard practice. One activist went so far as to prepare a formal white
paper.114
3. Other Findings
Money also helps any campaign and, as described in the Introduction
above, hedge funds now have a lot of it.115 Four of them used their financial
clout to offer to buy their targets outright, perhaps more in the hope of
shaking things up than in actually completing a transaction.116 A fifth
actually did so. In a somewhat aggressive use of the new short-form
Schedule 13G rules for passive investors,117 Edward Lampert’s ESL
Investments negotiated a purchase of Sears over a period of several weeks
without disclosing anything at all. Then, only after the acquisition
agreement was actually signed, was a full Schedule 13D filed.118 ESL did
get sued over this tactic – how does a supposedly “passive” investor wind
up buying a whole company? – but by then it was too late.119 The
acquisition was already an accomplished fact.
112
See Cenveo, Inc., Definitive Additional Materials Filed By Non-Registrant
(Schedule 14A) (Aug. 24, 2005) (letter brief submitted to ISS presenting dissident’s case on
directors’ fiduciary duties).
113
See Der Hovanesian, supra note 3, at 72 (observing that activists are “recruiting new
allies on Wall Street,” and citing the investment banks hired in the Wendy’s and Time Warner
situations); Gregory Zuckerman, Activist Hedge Funds Win Fans on Wall Street, WALL ST. J.,
May 8, 2006, at C1 (citing the investment banks hired in the Six Flags and Acxiom situations).
114
See Wendy’s International, Inc., Schedule 13D filed by Trian group (Dec. 12, 2006)
(paper entitled “Wendy’s International, Inc. – A Recipe for Successful Value Creation”).
115

See supra text at notes 6-7.

116
See Acxiom Corp., Schedule 13D filed by ValueAct Capital (July 14, 2005); Circuit
City Stores, Inc., Schedule 13D filed by Highfields Capital Management, L.P. (Mar. 8, 2005);
Houston Exploration Co., Schedule 13D filed by Jana Partners (June 22, 2006); Mylan
Laboratories, Inc., Soliciting Material Filed By Non-Registrant (Schedule 14A) (June 1,
2005).
117

See supra text at notes 59-62.

118

See Sears, Roebuck and Co., Schedule 13D filed by ESL Investments, Inc. (Nov. 19,
2004) (cover-page box indicating a switch from Schedule 13G to Schedule 13D is checked).
119
Such a result is possible if the investor only becomes definitively non-passive ten
days or less before filing a Schedule 13D. See supra text at notes 43-49 and 59-62. As of this
writing, the litigation over whether ESL was really passive while it relied on Schedule 13G is
pending. See Levie v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 04C7643, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12725
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2006) (denying motion to dismiss).
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At this point, another of the survey’s findings necessarily enters the
discussion: for all its public-relations nastiness, hedge fund activism rarely
results in campaign-time litigation. Although several situations appear to
have involved significant law suits, only three of them appear to have been
company-instigated. It is not hard to guess why this might be so. Many
knowledgeable observers believe that suing hedge fund activists is “more
likely to alienate other shareholders these days.”120 Just two of these
disputes produced truly full-out litigation. The court proceedings in the
Sovereign Bank contest basically went nowhere, but left the insurgent
struggling with only mixed success against Pennsylvania’s particularly
unfriendly corporate regime.121 The company’s poison pill and Schedule
13D “group” lawsuits in the Bally contest, on the other hand, also went
nowhere while seeming actually to help the insurgents.122
Finally, the survey found hedge fund activists using a number of other
tactics that will already be familiar to close observers of the shareholder
activism scene. The short slate rule adopted with the 1992 proxy reforms
described earlier123 apparently continues to see little actual use, as it appears
only twice.124 Written material under the 1992 “free speech” rule appears in
only one contest.125 Another dissident used a public solicitation of consents
to call a special meeting (the dissident by itself did not own enough shares)
120
See Phyllis Plitch, Lawyers See No Poison Pill To Feed Hedge Fund “Wolf Packs,”
CORP. GOVERNANCE, Dec. 21, 2005, at 4, 19 (summarizing views of Wall Street lawyers); see
also Briggs, supra note 1, at 135-36 (subsection entitled “Litigation: the New Risk
Calculus”); Katz & McIntosh, supra note 4, at 7 (noting lack of recent anti-hedge fund
litigation and commenting that “a scorched-earth litigation campaign may alienate important
shareholders and turn the tide against management”).
121

See Eric Dash, Sovereign Bank Settles Dispute with Shareholder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 2006, at C18 (summarizing litigation and settlement). For a succinct description of the
antitakeover aspects of Pennsylvania corporate law, see William G. Lawlor, Peter D. Cripps
& Ian A. Hartman, Doing Public M&A Deals in Pennsylvania: Minesweeper Required, 38
REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 191 (2005).
122
After the threatened filing of the suits, the principal dissident’s fight letters regularly
cited them as an example of the company’s poor judgment, and noted that they also apparently
helped influence ISS to recommend voting for the dissidents. See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness
Holding Corp., Definitive Additional Material Filed By Non-Registrant (Schedule 14A)
(Jan.17, 2006) (fight letter prominently noting ISS’s disapproval of the company’s “extremely
rare” and “potentially extreme” attempted application of its poison pill to thwart a stockholder
vote in a proxy contest).
123

See supra text at notes 38-40.

124

See BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement Filed By NonRegistrant (Schedule 14A) (May 23, 2005) (proxy card using short slate rule); H.J. Heinz Co.,
Definitive Proxy Statement Filed By Non-Registrant (Schedule 14A) (July 12, 2006) (same).
125

See Houston Exploration Co., Notice of Exempt Solicitation filed by Jana Partners
(Apr. 24, 2006) (opening salvo in longer campaign).
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in an ultimately successful attempt to bluff management into a settlement.126
And on at least two occasions, dissidents used Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust
notification filings, which are generally required only of active investors, to
indicate their seriousness of purpose as an apparent prelude to starting
settlement discussions.127
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND FULL DISCLOSURE
The central question running throughout any examination of hedge fund
activists is this: Can we trust them?128 According to critics, they are shortterm traders whose interests frequently diverge from those of a company’s
other shareholders.129 Worse still, their secretive and complex trading
strategies can sometimes mean that they actually may want a company’s
strategies to fail.130 There is indeed practically a whole catalogue of
possible disclosed and undisclosed sins that a hedge fund (or anyone else)
might commit in the course of an activist campaign, and hedge funds seem
to have been accused of committing them all. Based on the data gathered in
the survey, however, there appears to be very little fire beneath all this
smoke, and what there is seems largely contained by present-day
regulations.
A. Hedged and Other Adverse Positions
Perhaps the most serious charge that can be leveled at hedge fund
activists is that their trading strategies may encourage them to destroy
corporate value rather than create it. What could possibly be worse for the
126
See AirNet Systems, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement Filed By Non-Registrant
(Schedule 14A) (May 11, 2005).
127

See General Motors, Inc., Schedule 13D filed by Tracinda group (Sept. 21, 2005);
Press Release, Kerr McGee Corp, Kerr-McGee Receives HSR Notice from Icahn (Feb. 18,
2005), http://www.kerr-mcgee.com/media/news/archive/news205/news_2050218.htm. The
passive investor exception from the Hart-Scott-Rodino filing rules for under-10% holders is at
16 C.F.R. § 802.9 (2006). See 1 STEPHEN M. AXINN ET AL., ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE
HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT § 6.07 (rev. ed. 2005); Malcomb R.
Pfunder, Shareholder Activism and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Exemption for Acquisitions of
Voting Securities Solely for the Purposes of Investment, ANTITRUST, Summer 2006, at 74.
128

Cf. Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 987 (1994) (an early elucidation of good investors gone bad).
129
See supra note 4 (quoting Martin Lipton); Anabtawi, supra note 14, at Part III.A
(subsection entitled “Short-Term Versus Long-Term Shareholders”).
130
See Anabtawi, supra note 14, at Part III.E (subsection entitled “Hedged Versus
Unhedged Shareholders”); Hu & Black, supra note 27 (describing hedging and vote buying
techniques); Andrew M. Kulpa, The Wolf in Shareholder’s Clothing, 6 U.C. DAVIS. BUS. L.J.
4 (2006) (hedge funds as corporate governance villains).
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other shareholders, especially if they have no inkling that their activist hero
is really short the stock?
The survey found very little evidence of these kinds of games, just six
possibly questionable situations. In three of these, the activist had a trading
position in a merger counterparty: ESL at Sears was long and supported the
merger; Icahn at Mylan Labs was short and opposed it; and Deephaven at
MCI was short and also opposed it.131 Only Deephaven seemed to provoke
skepticism on the part of other investors, and this may have been because
the fund further disclosed positions both in MCI’s bonds and in a competing
acquirer’s stock and bonds. Deephaven’s campaign consequently seemed
profoundly, almost impenetrably tactical and so won the support of neither
ISS nor of many other investors.132 Evidently MCI’s investors could read,
and they were not easily led astray.
Two of these six activists were hedged, and leave the disinterested
observer wondering whether all politics must indeed be local. The dissident
fund in a proxy contest for three board seats at Exar Corporation last year
disclosed that it held less than one percent of the stock and that 96 percent
of the shares were “boxed” or fully hedged with offsetting short positions.133
The dissident was thus almost completely indifferent to how the company
performed since a “boxed” position is capable of generating no further profit
or loss; nevertheless, ISS recommended a vote for the fund anyway and it
won. The seemingly far more complicated situation with Carl Icahn’s
advisee in his contest at Time Warner, on the other hand, seems to have
been interpreted as nothing more than a clever way of acquiring an interest
in the most shares for the least risk and cost.134 The sixth activist, the author
of the value enhancement white paper in the Wendy’s campaign, disclosed
that its interest in the company was mostly in privately negotiated put and
call options that appear to have been entered into as a short-term financing
device.135 Here, too, the complexity of the dissident’s position seems to

131
See Sears Schedule 13D, supra note 118; Mylan Labs., Inc., Schedule 13D filed by
High River group (Dec. 17, 2004); MCI, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A)
(Sept. 1, 2005).
132
See MCI, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 7, 2005) (reporting that the merger
received the support of 88% of the votes cast and 65% of the stock outstanding).
133

See Exar Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Oct. 3, 2005).

134

See Liz Rappaport, UBS Note Sale to Give Icahn More Sway Over Time Warner,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2006, at C4; Time Warner, Inc., Schedule 13D filed by Icahn advisee
(Feb. 16, 2006).
135

See Schedule 13D, supra note 114.
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have caused little comment or concern.136
The allegedly value-destroying short term approach of many hedge
funds activists is harder to analyze, but again seems to cause little concern
for other investors.137 As noted in the Introduction,138 hedge funds are under
intense pressure to perform now, today, but this does not exactly make them
all that different from many other Wall Street institutions. Even the most
obvious and public short-term versus long-term conflict in the survey
apparently drew little or no publicly reported fire from other investors: the
dissident in the Knight Ridder sell-the-company campaign was widely said
to be angling for a $300 million performance bonus payment from its
corporate parent, but few seemed to care. Knight Ridder was sold anyway,
and for a price that many felt was disappointing.139
Although the corporate governance literature is full of dire warnings
about how large shareholder activists might seek to divert corporate monies
to themselves,140 the survey did not find evidence of any more direct
adverse hedge fund behavior, such as greenmail or other similar conflicts.
Several hedge funds in the survey managed to get some of their proxy
contest expenses reimbursed, but this has been normal and customary
136

See Andrew R. Sorkin, An Investor Takes Aim At Wendy’s, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2005, at C1.
137
According to one hedge fund manager, “the ‘short-term’ versus ‘long-term’
distinction is often a nonsensical cover-up for poor performance from managers who have
failed to deliver results over either horizon.” Barry Rosenstein, Activism Is Good for All
Shareholders, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at 17. Many academic commentators also seem
unconvinced by the supposed evils of short-term investing. See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 242-43 (1994) (characterizing “short termism” as little more
than a “debater’s weapon” deployed by defenders of corporate managers). Some even
actively defend short-termism. See Joe Nocera, A Defense of Short-Termism, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 2006, at B1, B8 (“[F]or all the anecdotal evidence of short-termism and its effects,
there isnot a lot of empirical data to back it up.”). On the other hand, an SEC commissioner
recently questioned “whether . . . short-time investors should be entitled to shareholder rights
in outright conflict with long-term investors.” Roel C. Campos, Speech by SEC
Commissioner: Remarks before the SIA-Hedge Fund Conference (Sept. 14, 2005),
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch091405rcc.htm.
138

See supra text at note 8.

139

See Joseph T. Hallinan & Dennis Berman, Knight Ridder to Decide on Sale, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 13, 2006, at A2; Joseph T. Hallinan, Legg-Mason-PCM Deal Included Payout
Pact That May Explain Timing on Knight Ridder Push, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2005, at C1
(noting approaching deadline for $300 million bonus performance measuring period).
140
See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 14, at Part IV; Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching
Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 855-61 (1992);
Rock, supra note 128, at 995-99; see also David A. Skeel, Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113
YALE L.J. 1519, 1529 (2004) (noting that in places like Germany and Japan “[b]lockholders
may use their influence to direct benefits to themselves at the expense of the company’s other,
scattered shareholders”).
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practice for decades.141 Only one fund appears to have become involved in
a more complicated situation. Barrington Capital started out with a board
seat at Register.com, lobbied unsuccessfully for a sale, and then started a
proxy contest for control. Barrington ended up abandoning its proxy contest
partner in mid-fight, settling for the reimbursement of up to $500,000 of its
expenses, and joining the company’s cash-short eventual acquirer as an
equity participant. The company’s special committee evidently pushed hard
for the settlement and seems to have worked to squeeze every last ounce of
possible juice from the buying group.142 Nothing in this admittedly
somewhat involved situation appears to resemble greenmail.143
B. Full Disclosure of Adverse Positions
The review thus far of hedge fund activism has shown that hedge fund
activists rarely pursue strategies that cannot withstand the light of day.144
But we really should not be surprised. Hedge funds know as well as anyone
else that sunlight is the best disinfectant. With only one recent known
exception,145 a competently advised fund that is truly bent on behavior that
might not do well in the sun is simply not going to purchase enough shares
to require a Schedule 13D filing, let alone start a high-profile proxy fight. It
necessarily seems to follow that current SEC disclosure laws as applied to
hedge fund activists146 already effectively require full disclosure of iffy
trading strategies, or much of this Article would not exist. But how true is
this really and could the rules do with some improvement?

141
See, e.g., Shopko Stores, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 29, 2005) ($300,000
expense reimbursement). Reimbursements, both as a result of a settlement and after an
outright victory, have been part of the proxy statement disclosure requirements for decades.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 4(b) (2006).
142
See Register.com, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 5-8, 18 (Sept.
20, 2005).
143

Possible hedge fund impropriety once in control of a company’s board presents a
different set of problems. See infra text at notes 242-47.
144

The only doubtful case turned up is MCI. See supra text at notes 131-32.

145

See infra, text at notes 158-60; Ianthe J. Dugan, Hedge Funds Get Warning on Use
of Merger Move, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at C1 (report that one of funds involved in the
Mylan-Icahn situation has received a Wells notice from the SEC’s enforcement division
questioning the fund’s Schedule 13D disclosure of its alleged vote buying); Andrew R.
Sorkin, Nothing Ventured, Everything Gained, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at C1 (describing
the situation).
146

Whether current SEC disclosure regulations sufficiently police ordinary hedge fund
trading activity is an extraordinarily complex question beyond the scope of this Article. See
Hu & Black, supra note 27.
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The disclosure rules in Rule 14a-12 battles and outright proxy fights147
require only a brief analysis. Based on a review of all the proxy filings in
the survey, it would seem that the SEC’s existing rules mandate the
disclosure of essentially everything that a hedge fund might otherwise want
to keep secret. Any other view would be practically unthinkable. As
authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court, the SEC’s proxy antifraud
rule mandates the inclusion of all “material” facts, and a fact is deemed
material “if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”148 As we have seen,
lawyers who draft proxy statements for activist hedge funds think that
people would want to know if their clients own bonds or are short, hedged,
or invested in the other side of a proposed transaction.149 The Second
Circuit, moreover, apparently agrees.150 It recently stopped a proxy
solicitation from going forward under the “free speech” rule, that is without
a proxy statement, at least in part because it was not satisfied with how the
dissident hedge fund had disclosed its short derivative position in a merger
counterparty’s bonds. The court rather dryly observed that the hedge fund’s
interests in defeating the company’s proposed merger consequently “may or
may not be in sync with the interests of other . . . shareholders.”151 The
actual proxy statement line-item disclosure requirement in this area then
becomes almost besides the point. It rather inadequately references only
“securities of the [company] which the [proxy] participant owns” and
therefore remains an almost quaint remnant of a prior, simpler time.152
If there is a five-percent shareholder but no proxy statement, Schedule
13D rules the day, and here the analysis gets somewhat more complicated.
The Schedule requires an investor to disclose any “contracts, arrangements,
[or] understandings . . . with respect to any securities” of the company in
addition to, as described earlier, its true purpose and intentions in holding
147
The same information about proxy participants’ shareholdings is required to be
included, directly or through incorporation by reference, in Rule 14a-12 material as in a full
proxy statement. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-12(a)(1) (2006).
148

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2006); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976) (leading “materiality” case in all United States securities law).
149

See supra Part III.A.

150

See MONY Group, Inc. v. Highfields Capital Mgmt., L.P., 368 F.3d 138 (2d Cir.

151

368 F.3d at 148.

2004).

152

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 5(b)(1) (2006). This formulation was adopted as part
of the original promulgation of the current proxy rules in 1956. See Release No. 5276, supra
note 23. See generally Frank Partnoy, Adding Derivatives to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 GA.
L. REV. 599, 599 (2000) (opening sentence declaring that “[i]n less than three decades,
financial derivatives have changed the world”).
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the stock.153 Disclosure of short positions,154 cash-settled derivatives155 and
positions of any kind in a proposed merger counterparty156 are not directly
called for. But in the context of a high-profile activist effort, the “purpose”
disclosure requirement in fact covers just about the same waterfront as the
proxy rules just discussed. After all, if a filer is hedged, short or otherwise
conflicted, it is at least highly doubtful that this would not affect its purpose
in holding the stock. The SEC has as much as said so twice in explicitly
warning that a short or futures transaction may constitute “a possible shift in
purpose” under the rules.157 The only shareholder activist in recent memory
known to have skirted the rule is Perry Corporation in the Carl Icahn-Mylan
Labs situation previously mentioned.158 Perry’s extraordinarily opaque
filing disclosed that it had purchased nearly ten percent of Mylan on a fully
hedged basis, that it also owned shares in Mylan’s proposed merger partner,
and that it supported the merger, but did not say how it had hedged.159 Wall
Street observers immediately understood that Perry was effectively buying
votes to support a merger Icahn opposed, but the SEC is nonetheless
apparently bringing civil enforcement proceedings.160 The conclusion that
153

17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Items 4 & 6 (2006); supra text at notes 47-49.

154

See H. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, SHORT-SELLING ACTIVITY IN THE STOCK
MARKET: MARKET EFFECTS AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION, H.R. REP. NO., 102-414, pt.
1, at 23 (1991), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1483, at 23 (Jan. 22, 1992) (“short
sellers who acquire a short position of this [five percent] magnitude in a company’s stock are
not subject to any similar [to Schedule 13D] reporting requirement”); Public Disclosure of
Material Short Security Positions, Exchange Act Release No. 29,278, [1991 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,806 (June 7, 1991) (acknowledging that Schedule 13D
“require[s] public reporting of material long (but not short) positions”).
155
A purely cash-settled derivative is evidently not a contract “with respect to any
securities of the company,” and is generally, in the author’s experience, not disclosed absent
special circumstances. See Hu & Black, supra note 27, at 868 (same). But the SEC has issued
a preliminary interpretative release in a closely related context stating that a purely cashsettled security future “would be a ‘contract . . . with respect to . . . securities of the
[company]’ under Item 6.” Securities Act Release No. 8107, 67 Fed. Reg. 43,234, 43,240
(June 27, 2002).
156

Although Schedule 13D does not require any disclosure at all with respect to
securities of another company, such a second filing of course would be required if the other
position independently reached the five-percent filing threshold and otherwise fell within the
ambit of the rules.
157
See Release No. 8107, supra note 155, at 43,240 (security futures); Release No.
29,278, supra note 154, at 88 n.29 (short positions).
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See supra text at notes 131 and 145.
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See Mylan Labs., Inc., Schedule 13D filed by Perry (Nov. 29, 2004).

160

See supra note 145. Icahn also sued Perry alleging inadequate Schedule 13D
disclosure and “vote buying” in an action subsequently dismissed. See High River L.P. v.
Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 487, 490 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (preliminary proceedings).
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Schedule 13D effectively calls for as full disclosure from a hedge fund
activist as the proxy rules therefore seems sound.
If there is a ten percent shareholder, the SEC’s insider ownership
reporting rules do specifically require disclosure of derivative positions as
well as direct stock ownership, and outlaw short sales entirely.161 The rules
do not cover straight debt or holdings in other companies. More to the
point, many hedge fund activists choose not to exceed the ten percent
threshold in the first place.162 The insider reporting rules therefore play but
a minor role in hedge fund activism, especially in light of the already fairly
complete disclosure mandated by Schedule 13D and the proxy rules just
described.
Finally, as this Article has shown, hedge fund activism with an
ownership level below the five percent Schedule 13D threshold only
happens relatively rarely.163 It is not hard to see why. An activist with such
a small stake typically has a commensurately difficult time gaining enough
attention to find its way into this Article’s data base at all, let alone enough
attention and (if need be) votes actually to succeed on the merits.164 A small
shareholder activist also suffers proportionately more than a large one from
collective action and free-riding problems.165 In other words, an activist
“bears most of the cost of a proxy campaign, but receives only a pro rata
share of the gains from success, while other shareholders can free ride” on
the activist’s efforts.166 Certainly from a current regulatory perspective, the
161

See Securities Exchange Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.16a-1 to .16c-4 (2006); PETER J. ROMEO & ALAN L. DYE, SECTION 16
TREATISE AND REPORTING GUIDE § 3.03 (2d ed. 2004) (subsection entitled “Derivative
Securities”). The SEC has summarized its approach to disclosing derivative positions under
Section 16 as follows: “The Commission agrees . . . that any manner of reporting an equity
swap, or an instrument with similar characteristics, that provides an adequate description is
appropriate.” Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 37,260, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶
85,810, at Part IV.H (May 31, 1996).
162

See supra note 101. Only twelve activists in the study owned over ten percent of
their target companies.
163

See supra text at note 101.

164

See John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, 20 J.
FIN. ECON. 237, 260 (1988) (empirical confirmation of the commonsense proposition that in a
proxy contest “[d]issident chances are significantly increased by . . . higher dissident
holdings”).
165

See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
J.L. & ECON. 395, 402 (1983) (observing that “[t]hose who have more shares . . . do not face
the collective action problem to the same extent” as those with fewer shares).
166

Black, supra note 140, at 821 (1992). See also George W. Dent, Jr., Toward
Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 903-04

2006]

Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism

32

Williams Act and the SEC’s implementing Schedule 13D rules take the
view that shareholders with less than a five percent stake pose so little threat
to corporate management and independence that they are simply not worth
bothering with.167 This Article’s comprehensive survey of publicly
disclosed activism in 2005 and 2006 has found little or nothing to gainsay
this judgment.
C. Reforming the Adverse Position Disclosure Rules
So what needs to be fixed? It would be easy to conclude from the
preceding examination of hedge fund activism problems and the related
proxy and Schedule 13D disclosure rules that hardly anything needs fixing.
But experienced lawyers will have already detected some straining. The
current rules work not because of their fundamentally sound design or
elegantly crafted line-item requirements. They work because of the general
antifraud rules and the well-founded fear of proxy statement and Schedule
13D drafters that leaving out something important (though not directly
called for by the line items) would be a very bad idea. A far better approach
would be to fix the line items of the rules so that they work well on their
own.
Proxy statements and Rule 14a-12 filings both require the same
participant ownership information and present the easiest case. Any activist
engaged in a “solicitation” is subject their requirements and, as explained
earlier, the SEC and the courts define and apply this term more than a bit
overbroadly.168 The real question then becomes how to fix the current rule’s
outdated reference only to beneficial ownership of company securities, that
is, to securities over which the participant has voting or dispositive
control.169 The problems empirically observed in Part III.A above and the
(arguing that high proxy contest expenses exacerbate collective action problems); Mark J.
Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 13 (1991)
(because a large shareholder “could capture a [larger portion] of the gains, the large
shareholder would often have the incentive to act, an incentive [smaller] fragmented
shareholders lack”).
167

See, e.g., Filing and Disclosure Requirements Relating to Beneficial Ownership,
Securities Act Release No. 5925, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,571, at
80,300 (Apr. 21, 1978) (adopting release for the current rules) (reviewing the legislative and
regulatory history of the Williams Act and noting that the statute and rules are directed at
“rapid accumulations of . . . equity securities in the hands of persons who would then have the
potential to change or influence control” of a public company); Comment, Section 13(d) and
Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 853 (1971) (Williams Act
legislative history).
168

See supra text at notes 22-24 and 50-55.

169

See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-3 & .14a-101, Item 5(b)(1) (2006).
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section 16 derivatives disclosure rules described in Part III.B above then
provide the six-part answer: First, section 16’s well-known, well-workedout and encyclopedically comprehensive derivatives disclosure regime also
should apply to proxy filings.170 Second, short as well as long positions
should be disclosed. Third, the rule should explicitly confirm that it covers
all debt or other obligations or any other item in the company’s capital
structure, even those that might not technically constitute a “security.”
Fourth, the entirety of the rule should reciprocally apply to ownership with
respect to any actual or known would-be merger or other extraordinary
transaction counterparty. Fifth, the rule should have a catch-all like
Schedule 13D’s reference to “[a]ny [item] similar to those enumerated
above.”171 And sixth, the rule should require a plain statement of the
practical effect of the positions disclosed, such as to establish a hedge, to
buy votes, or to create an incentive to support or oppose a proposed
transaction requiring a shareholder vote. Taken together, all these changes
should clarify the rule’s application considerably without altering anything
fundamentally.
Schedule 13D disclosure actually presents two separate issues, who files
and what gets disclosed. Since this Article has found nothing so wrong with
the five-percent filing threshold as to require fixing, the first issue reduces to
how to perform the percentage calculation. And here there would appear to
be but one sensible answer: include derivatives. A hedge fund, for
example, that held 3% of a company’s shares “in prime broker” (that is
outright) and 3% “in swap” (that is an economic interest held through a
derivatives contract) would thus find itself captured by the reporting system.
In this day and age there really is not much of an excuse for any lesser
approach.172
Once a Schedule 13D is required, the simplest and most consistent
reform would be to incorporate the proxy rules changes just described. The
risk, however, is that doing so might create a horrific and unnecessarily
tangled mess out of many otherwise plain vanilla filings. Or stated
differently, not every Schedule 13D represents a potential instance of
inadequately disclosed “hedge fund activism” run amok. There probably is
no easy answer. Perhaps the most direct, albeit highly imperfect solution
might be to add an “if material” qualifier to the new disclosure
requirements, and to provide a safe-harbor list of situations deemed
170

See supra note 161.

171

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Item 4(j) (2006).

172
See, e.g., Hu & Black, supra note 27, at 867-71 (subsection entitled “Large
Shareholder Disclosure”) (recommending this approach after extensive analysis).
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immaterial. There would be no reason, for example, to require disclosure of
positions completely extraneous to the “purpose” of the investment as
specifically set forth in the Schedule. Perhaps the best that can be said of
the details here is that they would no doubt benefit mightily from the noticeand-comment rulemaking process.
IV. BALANCE OF POWER POLITICS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Plainly hedge fund activists have a role to play in corporate governance.
This Article has shown that when they choose to get involved, hedge funds
can be a real force to be reckoned with. The question then becomes how
they fit into current corporate governance theories and, more practically,
whether they improve governance or worsen it. The answer requires a look
at hedge funds both as shareholders without more and (assuming proxy
contest or settlement success) as shareholders with direct board
representation.
A. Why Hedge Fund Activism Matters
But given how infrequently this Article has found that hedge funds do
get directly involved, there is an obvious threshold question: why should
we care about this answer or, put differently, does hedge fund activism
matter? Whatever else might be uncertain in our post-Enron world, there
would appear to be little room for doubt on this point: we should care about
hedge fund activism because the people who run and advise United States
public companies care. In other words, those most directly affected by
takeovers and proxy fights tell us we should care.173 According to Martin
Lipton’s recent advice to his clients, for example, “[t]he current high level
of hedge fund activism warrants the same kind of preparation as for a hostile
takeover bid.”174 The press reports reviewed in the Introduction tell the
same story, albeit in somewhat over-wrought terms.175
Delaware
Chancellor Leo Strine has similarly noted “the power of a good example”
and predicted that “[r]emoving a few poorly performing boards will have
173
See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. An interesting recent twenty-year
study has found that “there is less need for takeover-related discipline to be applied to target
firms when a higher level of monitoring is already in place, as indicated by a higher
proportion of outside directors and/or greater [shareholder] blockholdings.” Omeshi Kini,
William Kracaw & Shehzad Mian, The Nature of Discipline by Corporate Takeovers, 59 J.
FIN. 1511, 1512 (2004).
174

Martin Lipton, Attacks By Activist Hedge Funds, M&A LAW., May 2006, at 1
(providing clients with a “Hedge Fund Attack Response Checklist”).
175

See supra text at notes 3-12. For a fairly typical example of hedge-fund hype, see
Battling for Corporate America from the normally staid ECONOMIST, supra note 5, at 69
(calling activist hedge funds “rampaging shareholders”).
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substantial, beneficial ripple effects on the performance of other boards.”176
Evidently the increasingly frequent number of publicly reported instances of
direct hedge fund activism is having a still broader, more important in
terrorem effect on an indeterminately wider universe of public companies.
Many successful hedge fund activism negotiations and settlements also
happen behind the scenes with little or no publicity.177 It is still true, as
Michael Useem wrote a decade ago, that “[o]pen struggles for control draw
attention but also mislead . . . [because] most of the traffic between
managers and investors transpir[es] out of sight.”178 This kind of quiet
activism can be thought of as a kind of Napoleonic military campaign. It is
not only the actual battles you fight that count.179 Real battles cost
casualties and money. Battles that the other side can be made to think you
are ready to fight matter just as much. Since unfought battles are much
cheaper than real ones, you can fight more of them with the same
expenditure of scarce manpower, time and money. And quiet, unpublicized
shareholder settlement victories count as victories nonetheless.180
Empirical and other academic studies that review only “proxy fights”
while excluding pressure campaigns and most contest settlements miss this
considerably larger universe of shareholder activism entirely and
consequently unintentionally understate its significance.181 In 2005, for
176

Strine, supra note 15, at 1768.

177
See Pound, Political Model, supra note 19, at 1056-57 (observing that private
negotiations “provide the most efficient and effective starting point for influencing the policies
of incumbents”).
178

MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM 169 (1996).

179

See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 212 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. &
trans. 1976) (1832) (subsection entitled “Possible Engagements Are To Be Regarded As Real
Ones Because of Their Consequences”); see also DAVID G. CHANDLER, THE CAMPAIGNS OF
NAPOLEON 163 (1966) (observing that Napoleon “was always eager to gain total victory for a
minimum of expenditure of manpower and effort” and so consequently “disliked having to
force a full-scale . . . frontal battle,” which was “inevitably expensive”).
180
See Reid Pearson & Ken Altman, Hedge Funds and Shareholder Activism, CORP.
GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, May-June 2006, at 22 (“Whether the company settles with the fund
or the fund wins during a proxy fight, hedge funds are having their demands met.”); cf.
Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 13, at 878 (arguing that increasing
shareholder power “would produce its benefits in large part by influencing management’s
behavior rather than by leading to actual interventions,” i.e., voting contests).
181
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, (SSRN
Working Papers, Oct. 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=829804 (relying on Georgeson
Shareholder data, which exclude all non-contests and contests settled before mailing, i.e., most
settled contests ); David Ikenberry & Joseph Lakonishok, Corporate Governance through the
Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS. 405 (1993) (study excluded settled
contests as well as target companies that were not still public and independent five years
later).
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example, only ten of the situations in this Article’s survey count as tracked
“proxy fights” in the widely-used Georgeson Shareholder Annual Corporate
Governance Review data.182 Acquiring a better understanding of hedge fund
activism means probing deeper into publicly reported hedge fund campaigns
– something this Article has taken a first step towards doing – though even
then quiet settlements, private negotiations and some less-reported situations
are inevitably missed.183 It only remains certain that hedge fund activism
plays a far more important role in corporate governance than a simple look
at the raw numbers would first suggest.
B. Activist Hedge Funds As Shareholders
Taking the reality of all this hedge fund activism and trying to fit it into
the various corporate governance theories that have been worked out over
the years makes for an interesting exercise. Nothing quite fits.
1. Ownership and Control
As with almost all exercises such as this one, the starting point is with
the 1932 classic by Adolf Berle and Gardner Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property,184 which first clearly articulated and
popularized the notion that widely dispersed shareholdings had effectively
separated ownership from control in public corporations. “Under such
conditions,” they wrote, “control may be held by the directors or titular
managers who can employ the proxy machinery to become a selfperpetuating body, even though as a group they own but a small fraction of
the stock outstanding.”185 By the mid 1970s, the principal concern had
become how shareholders (the owners) could control and monitor their
agents (the directors and managers) while minimizing the “monitoring costs
designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent[s].”186 Such activities
182

See Georgeson Shareholder, supra note 18, at 44 (list of tracked contests).

183

See supra Part II.A.

184
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1st ed. 1932).
185

Id. at 5-6.

186
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305 (1976), reprinted
in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 7, 7 (Roberta Romano ed. 1993). See also
Symposium, Corporations and Private Property, 26 J.L. & ECON. 235 (1983). Many of the
papers in this symposium on the Berle and Means book continue to be cited frequently,
including Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & ECON. 301, 313-14 (1983) (commenting that “the takeover market provides an external
court of last resort for protection” of stockholders).
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might include almost any imaginable unremunerative sin, including
shirking, chasing after perquisites, empire building, and host of other “rent
seeking” crimes. An influential group of scholars writing in this tradition
came to see the corporation as a “nexus” or “complex set of explicit and
implicit contracts” among employees, managers and other constituencies,
with the shareholders getting “votes rather than explicit promises.”
According to the theory, “[v]otes make it possible to replace the
managers.”187
This is where the problems begin. What does it mean to “vote” and
“monitor” when, by hypothesis, shareholders are too dispersed and beset by
the collective action problems discussed earlier188 really to do either? If
they were somehow to overcome these problems enough to monitor closely,
at what point do they start usurping the management role? And what
qualifies them to manage better than the managers themselves anyway? Are
board members really mere agents?
2. Shareholder Primacy
The predominant theoretical response to these and other related
questions has come to be called “shareholder primacy,” and means basically
what the name implies. Shareholders should have the “ultimate control over
the corporation.”189 Since this demonstrably happens only rarely in the
actual everyday world of uncontrolled public companies, two of the main
avenues of academic inquiry have been why not and how to fix it. The
reasons why not are extraordinarily complex, but basically boil down to the
collective action problems already mentioned,190 insufficient incentives,191
187

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416, 1418, 1421 (1989). See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social
Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CINN. L. REV. 347, 348
(1991) (“The most immediate concern is whether shareholders can use their power to change
the composition of the board of directors through the election process, thus to monitor
corporate activity more closely.”).
188

See supra text at notes 163-67.

189

See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 832; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The
End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (claiming that shareholder
primacy has become the “consensus” view and that other views have been vanquished); Adam
Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance
at the End of History, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS, Autumn 2004, at 109 (presenting a
progressive criticism of shareholder primacy).
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See supra, text at notes 165-66.

See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, Bernard Black & Margaret Blair, Relational Investing and
Firm Performance, 27 J. FIN. RES. 1 (2004); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making
Shareholder Activism a Valued Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. REG. 174
(2001). See generally John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, Does Weak
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conflicts of interest,192 legal obstacles193 and management power.194
Institutional investors consequently generally remain unwilling to spend the
time and money to exercise their voting rights fully, that is, to launch proxy
fights for control. There is no easy fix. The SEC has proposed letting
shareholders put their own director nominees on the official company proxy
card at the company’s expense;195 Lucian Bebchuk has taken this one step
further and proposed an almost California-like initiative-and-referendum
voting procedure that would give shareholders a direct voice in major
“rules-of-the-game” decisions currently controlled by boards of directors.196
The object in any event is to help shareholders exercise in practice their
power in theory.197
For a hedge fund activist, much of shareholder primacy doctrine is
already irrelevant or worse, and its fundamental premise that ownership is
separated from control seems at best only imperfectly true when it matters
most – when the fund is actively investing. A hedge fund that steps in to
call the shots at one of its public portfolio companies eliminates the
separation and pulls the levers of corporate power directly. By winning
board seats, the fund has succeeded in making its voting franchise effective.
And as George Dent put it several years ago, an “effective shareholder
franchise . . . remed[ies] the separation of ownership and control and, with
it, most other corporate governance problems.”198 Throwing out an
incumbent board refutes the “separation” thesis: control rejoins ownership.

Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns?, 61 J. FIN. 655 (2006) (finding no empirical support
for the hypothesis that weak governance causes weak stock performance).
192

See Anabtawi, supra note 14; Camara, supra note 1.

193

See Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 2, at 530-66 (comprehensive
summary); John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837 (1994).
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See Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 2, at 591-95.
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See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003)
(evidently this proposal is now dead); Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 13 (arguing
in favor of the proposed rule).
196

See Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, supra note 13, at 844.
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See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 165 at 396 (criticizing and summarizing this
approach as “[t]hings will get better if we step up the efforts to attain real corporate
democracy”).
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See Dent, supra note 166, at 882; see also George Dent, Comment: The Case for
Real Shareholder Democracy, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581 (2005) (reprising proposal that
the ten or twenty largest shareholders should select a company’s official slate of director
nominees); George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight, 31 J.
CORP. L. 39, 67-75 (2005) (same).
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Shareholders willing to wage a proxy fight for control are by
definition not fundamentally deterred by any of the problems with the
current proxy and corporate rules that supposedly need fixing. Otherwise
they would not be activists. Specifically, they have enough shares not to be
stymied by the collective action conundrum, their holdings are sufficiently
concentrated and undiversified to provide an incentive to act in a chosen
instance, they do not have trouble attracting like-minded and unconflicted
hedge-fund and other allies, they are more than willing to pay expensive
lawyers to dodge the legal obstacles, and they care as much about
management’s power to stop them as General von Rundstedt did about the
Maginot Line in the Spring of 1940.199 To repeat, otherwise they would not
be activists. Proxy fights cost money, and hedge fund activists can and do
pay the price.
Other shareholders are not as willing to pay. As for the shareholder
primacists’ proposed solutions to this problem, these are downright toxic to
hedge funds. The main issue is that recently proposed solutions amount to a
subsidy for these other shareholders who either cannot or will not pay their
own way and, as Roberto Romano recently observed in a related context,
“[i]t is textbook economics that parties bearing the full cost of their actions
make better decisions than those that do not.”200 For a real-life illustration
of this point, we have only to look at who uses the SEC’s current
shareholder proposal rule. Rule 14a-8 lets basically anyone with only $2000
worth of stock run a 500-word proposal for free in the company’s proxy
statement.201 It is not hard to guess what has happened. The rule has been
hijacked by those with agendas other than the merely economic: in 2005,
for example, more than half (54%) the governance proposals came from
labor unions, religious organizations and public pension funds; and another
22% came from individual investors having ten or more proposals, or in
other words professional gadflies.202 An earlier study of the shareholder
proposal process reviewed similar statistics and concluded that
“nontraditional” sponsors such as these appear “more interested in using the
proxy device as a communication or bargaining tool, rather than maximizing

199
See supra Part II; see also Robert C. Pozen, To Regulate or Not?, WALL ST. J., June
20, 2005, at A14 (“With their holdings concentrated in a few stocks, hedge funds often have
more financial incentive . . . [for aggressive activism] than mutual funds or pension plans with
broadly diversified portfolios.”).
200

Romano, supra note 191, at 230.

201

See Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2006).
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See Georgeson Shareholder, supra note 18, at 11, 34-37 (detailed figures and tables).
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shareholder welfare.”203 Detailed studies of union and public pension fund
activism have reached the same conclusion.204 No matter what the outcome
of the actual votes on these proposals, and even if we assume that
shareholders have gotten pretty good at separating the value-enhancing
wheat from the social-agenda chaff,205 the whole to-do nevertheless remains
a significant waste of time and money. Subsidizing these kinds of noneconomic agendas does not seem like the most value maximizing policy
imaginable.
Hedge funds would in any event likely not qualify to receive the
subsidy. Any politically palatable consolidated directors’ ballot, including
the one that the SEC has proposed, would likely limit access strictly to longterm, passive holders.206 Hedge fund activists are never passive and are
frequently short-term to boot.
Similarly, Bebchuk’s initiative-andreferendum proposal would merely empower other large institutional
shareholders whose competence, conflict-free judgment and frequently
overtly political or at least non-economic goals may be highly suspect.207 In
short, empowering these kinds of other shareholders would inevitably bring
unwanted and distrusted competition to the corporate governance table.
Hedge fund activists therefore paradoxically practice shareholder primacy
but cannot believe in it as an academic theory.
3. Director Primacy

203

See Stephen Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Proxy Reforms,
16 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 233, 266 (2000).
204
See Romano, supra note 191, at 231 (“It is quite probable that private benefits accrue
to some investors from sponsoring at least some shareholder proposals. The disparity in
identity of sponsors – the predominance of public and union funds . . . – is strongly suggestive
of their presence.”); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall Thomas, Realigning Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1023 (1998)
(“[W]e suspect that the goal behind some of the union-shareholder activity is to become more
involved in strategic decisions . . . . Shareholder activism is a promising way of getting the
attention of top management and the board of directors.”). See also Roberta Romano, Public
Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 796
(1993) (noting the vulnerability of public pension funds to “local considerations, such as
fostering in-state employment, which are not aimed at maximizing the value of their
portfolios’ assets”).
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See Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, supra note 13, at 1799-1804
(arguing that shareholders generally know the right proposals to vote for).
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See Security Holder Director Nominations, supra note 195, at 60,805-06 (restricting
access to two-year “passive” holders).
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See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 14; Camara, supra note 1; ISS, 2005 Postseason
Report, supra note 75, at 35-49 (detailing labor and “socially responsible investment”
priorities and results).
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The opposite of shareholder primacy is “director primacy,” a theory
championed by Stephen Bainbridge and others.208 According to Bainbridge,
this approach remains grounded in the fundamental “nexus of contracts”
model, but treats the corporation as something the board of directors uses to
hire “various factors of production.” 209 The directors do and should run the
show by fiat as “a sort of Platonic guardian.”210 Shareholders at most react
to what the board proposes. Director primacy recognizes this shareholder
weakness and actually welcomes it: their weakness contributes to director
power, which in turn leads to efficient decision-making and greater
shareholder wealth.211 Director primacy very much draws the line between
authority and accountability in favor of authority.212 The shareholders’ right
to throw out an incumbent board thus remains only as “an accountability
device of last resort.”213
Hedge fund activists fit into the director primacy paradigm as
paradoxically as they did into shareholder primacy. They must believe in
director primacy as an academic theory, but they do not practice it. They
have to believe in it as a theory for three reasons. First, boards actually do
run most corporations,214 and any theory that accurately explains reality
automatically has some considerable claim to validity. Second, having a
strong board in charge is always efficient215 and usually satisfactory to the
shareholders in the sense that activists leave most public companies alone.
Third and most important, director primacy provides a theoretical
framework for justifying the exclusion of the wider “shareholder activism”
community, the big institutions of even bigger possible economic
untrustworthiness.216 What self-respecting hedge fund, for example, would
brook for an instant the non-economic and personal agendas often pursued

208
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See Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 14, at 1735.
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See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 14, at 605.
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See Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 14, at 1750.
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See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2001) (requiring the “business and affairs of
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supra note 15, at 21 & n.8 (collecting cases).
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by so many public pension funds and unions?217
When it comes to actual practice, however, things are very different.
Unless an activist hedge fund itself controls a board of directors, it cannot
believe in director primacy. Otherwise it would not have become a
shareholder activist and would not be trying either to tell the current
directors what to do or to replace them outright. For a hedge fund, the
shareholders’ right to replace directors is anything but an “accountability
device of last resort.”
A glance at the “principal issues” and “result” columns in the Appendix
reveals what this actually means. In almost every case, the hedge funds in
the study focused on direct economic issues such as blocking or forcing a
corporate sale or otherwise enhancing value with a stock buy-back, asset
sale or other similar effort. Apart from the “end game” corporate sale issue,
which would require a shareholder vote in any event, much of this kind of
activity necessarily involves assuming a degree of operational control that is
fundamentally inconsistent with director primacy. Setting a dividend rate or
determining how many shares to repurchase are matters not normally
entrusted to the shareholders. Conversely, purely corporate governance
issues seem to take a back seat to the economic issues. Destaggering a
board of directors, for example, has hedge-fund meaning only to the extent
that it leads directly to enhanced economic performance for the fund. Like
many academics,218 hedge fund managers evidently remain unconvinced or
agnostic on how directly corporate governance issues correlate with
economic profitability and higher stock prices.
An important variant of the director primacy theme, the “team
production” theory, similarly places the board of directors at the center of
corporate power.219 Under this theory, the board acts as a trusted referee or
“mediating hierarch” holding sway over all the different team members that
contribute to corporate success. Shareholder voting generally plays no role
at all except as “a safety net to protect against extreme misconduct.”220 But
a hedge fund concerned with enhancing value through a stock buy-back or
with gaining board seats to run a company more profitably is hardly
217
See supra note 204 and accompanying text. See also Chris Young, Hedge Funds to
the Rescue, BUS. WK., July 31, 2006, at 86 (“[L]eft-leaning pension funds have long taken
activist stands on pet peeves such as golden parachutes or the labor impact of a proposed deal.
Hedge funds, however, maintain a laser focus on shareholder value.”).
218

See supra note 191 and accompanying text.

219

See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). See also Symposium, Team Production in Business
Organizations, 24 J. CORP. L. 743 (1999).
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See Blair & Stout, supra note 219, at 312.
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concerned with “extreme misconduct,” or even any misconduct at all. The
company’s board of directors might be doing a simply okay job where the
hedge fund might believe that a real home run might be possible if only it
could step into the batter’s box itself.221 The originators of the team
production theory, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, forthrightly admit that
their theory does not really work well here, but argue that real shareholder
activism and voting does not figure into how most public companies operate
most of the time.222 The findings of the present Article, however, suggest
that hedge fund activists have significantly undermined unfettered director
power at more than just a few companies, and much of director primacy
theory along with it.
Blair and Stout do not stop here. They intriguingly suggest in the
conclusion of their path-breaking article that their approach reveals the
“fundamentally political nature of the corporation,” and that future
scholarship should look into how shareholders and other corporate
constituencies use “political tools, in addition to economic and legal tools”
to try to capture a larger share of firm profits.223 Much of the present Article
attempts just such an examination of the most active shareholders, namely
hedge funds.
4. Balance-of-Power Politics
Evidently none of these theories really fits what activist hedge funds do,
which brings us to naked balance-of-power politics as perhaps the most
accurate way of thinking about how they actually operate. For them,
corporate governance seems most like a kind of war with a putatively
failing, slothful or simply ineffective board of directors as the enemy.
The best starting point here might be the almost nihilistic “connected
contracts” metaphor outlined a few years ago by three professors at
UCLA.224 According to this approach, the “interrelated agreements” among
the participants in a business are little more than ad hoc arrangements:
“there are no firms, no predetermined hierarchies, no organizations . . . and
no a priori notions of ownership or control; there is no shareholder or
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See, e.g., Kerr McGee Corp., Schedule 13D filed by Icahn (Mar. 3, 2005) (start of
proxy fight to elect directors who will sell assets and reallocate corporate resources to a stock
buy-back).
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See Blair & Stout, supra note 219, at 309-315.

223

See Blair & Stout, supra note 219, at 323.

224
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UCLA L. REV. 887 (2000).
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managerial primacy and no centralizing ‘nexus.’”225 In a word, “there is
nothing to govern.”226 For a public shareholder, what inevitably ensues is a
sort of virtually formless political free-for-all essentially devoid of
theoretical principles. But this is not necessarily bad. “[I]nsurgency,
contention, and debate are fundamental to effective corporate governance,”
as John Pound once put it in the conclusion to his aptly titled article The
Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control.227
This is really little more than the raw balance-of-power politics familiar
to any historian of eighteenth century Europe. According to one classic text,
statesmen of that era confronted “an anarchic . . . society in which expansion
was left free until it was checked by conflicting ambitions, expressed in
terms of the balance of power.”228 This principle, in turn, was found more
useful than international law, which was then “nothing more than a war
code.”229 Translated into the language of hedge fund activism, this means
that proxy fights and the threat of proxy fights operate far more efficiently
to exercise control over directors than the purely legal alternatives –
occasionally ephemeral fiduciary-duty legal principles and the vagaries of
the market for corporate control.230
Reliance on fiduciary-duty principles is misplaced because they are so
limited. Duty of loyalty compliance usually requires little more than
honesty in fact and a high tolerance for putting up with independentcommittee board procedures.231 Duty of care compliance requires even less.
Ordinary workaday director decisions are almost always protected by the
business judgment rule, which amounts to a standard of gross negligence.232
The courts accordingly hardly second-guess any director decisions at all.233
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Reliance on the disciplining effect of takeovers is equally misplaced. Apart
from regulatory problems and a host of other issues including sheer size,
legal devices such as staggered boards and poison pills can make many
companies practically takeover-proof.234 Like international law in the
Eighteenth Century, fiduciary-duty principles and the supposedly
disciplining effect of takeovers appear less than completely satisfactory
instruments of shareholder defense and control.
Yet another paradox lurks here. As noted in the Introduction, many in
the corporate community believe that the corporate governance status quo
remains fundamentally sound.235 According to Martin Lipton and Steven
Rosenblum, the present system “has developed over many years . . . through
an ongoing process of experimentation and experience,” and already makes
“running an election contest through separate proxy materials . . . a viable
alternative.”236 Gilchrest Sparks, a dean of the Delaware corporate bar, has
similarly observed that the current director-centered system appears
“robust,” and that the possibility of running a stand-alone proxy contest
against an incumbent board is “becoming more rather than less real,” thanks
in part to “the dramatic increase in focused capital available in the hands of
hedge funds.”237 This self-satisfied rhetoric is not altogether empty. Hedge
funds are rarely mistaken for status quo apologists, but (paradoxically) this
is evidently what they believe, too, or else they would not act the way they
do. In the hands of a well-financed activist such as a hedge fund, proxy
fights make a viable and useful corporate governance tool.
At least in Delaware, takeover defenses generally do not work against
should not second-guess the business decisions of directors, and the Delaware courts have not
done so”). See generally Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991) (weak effectiveness of shareholder litigation as
a governance monitoring device).
234
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV.
887, 914, 928 (2002) (finding that no hostile takeover “in recent memory” has ever succeeded
against a company with both a poison pill and a staggered board of directors); Holman W.
Jenkins, Jr., Don’t Sweat It: There’s Nothing Wrong with Corporate Governance That the
Threat of a Hostile Takeover Couldn’t Fix, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R8 (lamenting the
post-pill weakness of the “market for corporate control,” noting that an “important negative
check on management went missing when we reined in hostile takeovers,” and arguing for
unspecified legal reforms to return the “bracing possibility” of hostile attacks to improve
corporate governance).
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proxy fights.238 For a hedge fund activist, an actual or threatened proxy
fight is therefore direct, efficient, and as ultimately determinative as one of
Napoleon’s battles. Beyond this, theory really does not enter much into it.
C. Activist Hedge Funds With Board Representation
Of course the entire approach changes if an activist fund succeeds in
gaining direct board representation, thus joining the “team.” At this point
the rules of the game shift, sometimes for the worse. This is especially true
when a fund achieves only minority board representation, such as when a
company’s board is staggered so that all directors are not up for election
every year, when the tactical choice is made to run a short slate or when a
negotiated settlement is but partially successful.
No matter what the situation, the federal securities laws effectively
mandate that any hedge fund with direct board representation become a
long-term investor. Such a fund will likely be considered a presumptive
“affiliate” sharing in company control, and so consequently will not be able
to sell shares freely in the market until some indeterminate time after the
board relationship ends.239 If the fund communicates with its board
representatives or anyone else at the company about company affairs, as will
often be the case, it will probably also find itself precluded from selling or
buying any shares because of the insider trading rules.240 Depending upon
the circumstances, there may even be the theoretical or real possibility of
short-swing profits disgorgement under Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act.241 All these rules effectively combine to preclude short-term
238
See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. Of course, an effective staggered
board will prevent a dissident from acquiring a majority of board seats in any single election,
and an advance-notice bylaw will constrain a dissident’s timing.
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See Robert A. Barron, Control and Restricted Securities, 20 SEC. REG. L.J. 194, 197
(1992) (summary of Securities Act rules); Robert A. Barron, Control and Restricted
Securities, 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 72 (1985) (addressing “affiliate” status of directors); Thomas
Gilroy & Paul N. Sheridan, Rule 144, in 3 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES § 38.01 (A.A.
Sommer, Jr., ed. 2005) (same). The facts-and-circumstances based complexities of
determining “affiliate” status have led the SEC to stop issuing no-action letters on the topic.
See Securities Act Release No. 6253, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 373 (Oct. 28, 1980). The
classic treatment remains A.A. Sommer, Jr., Who’s “In Control”? – S.E.C., 21 BUS. LAW.
559 (1966).
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See Exchange Act Rules 10b-5 & 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5 & .10b5-2 (2006);
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Decision, 20 SEC. REG. L.J. 296 (1992) (review of insider trading rules applying to
institutional investors).
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trading once one or more board seats are obtained.
State laws concerning director fiduciary duties further constrain an
activist fund. Once on the board, even dissident directors elected after a
proxy fight owe the complete entirety of their fiduciary obligations to the
company as a whole and all its shareholders, not just to the activist that
nominated them.242 The fiduciary obligation of loyalty, in particular, cannot
be limited or disclaimed, and effectively makes financial hanky-panky with
the company impossible, or at least subject to the exacting “entire fairness”
standard of judicial scrutiny.243 This rule can make even otherwise ordinary
dealings substantively subject to judicial second-guessing and procedurally
difficult to accomplish without cumbersome “independent committee”
review and approval.244 The SEC’s rules specifically mandating the
disclosure of these kinds of “related party” transactions exacerbate matters
by casting perhaps unwanted sunlight into these otherwise dark corners, and
recently adopted rules now require disclosure of the company’s transaction
approval procedures as well.245 Careful advance planning and detailed
consultations with lawyers experienced with these kinds of issues slow
decision-making at every turn.
It logically follows that a dissident director’s fiduciary duties extend to
any information received as a director, and that all this information must be
kept confidential and not misused. In the words of the leading Delaware
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case, if the director “violates that duty, the law provides a remedy.”246
Sometimes corporations even manage to extract an explicit promise that a
dissident board member simply will not share anything he learns with his
sponsoring fund.247 Monitoring an investment under these kinds of
informational constraints can frequently wind up being neither easy nor
even particularly efficient or effective.
If a fund has won only minority representation, the problems deepen.
The very structure of the board itself can work against the dissident faction.
Boards act collegially.248 Indeed, “[c]ommon sense tells us that the
constantly carping critic . . . is unlikely to be effective in persuading any
group to effective collective action.”249 The dissidents can find themselves
ostracized and left out of caucuses where all the real decisions are taken or,
in truly extreme cases, excluded from a newly-formed executive committee
with de facto plenary authority to run the company without any dissident
input at all.250 Alternatively, a weak-willed dissident may succumb to
cooption or outright capture.251 Sometimes, too, a dissident board faction
246
Henshaw v. American Cement Corp., 252 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch. 1969). See also 2
DAVID A. DREXLER, LEWIS S. BLACK, JR. & A. GILCHRIST SPARKS, III, DELAWARE
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 27.05 (2005).
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General Housewares Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 28, 1999) (resigning director
setting forth text of board resolution prohibiting communications with “family, friends or
business associates” or company advisors outside the presence of senior management).
Because this kind of resolution could interfere with a director’s exercise of his fiduciary
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board.”).
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can simply find itself outvoted.252 One of the funds in the survey went so
far as to refuse a proffered board seat because it did not see how, “[a]s one
vote among twelve,” it would have “any greater ability to effect change”
than as an ordinary outside shareholder.253
The actual experiences of many dissident directors, however, paint a
picture not nearly so bleak. Even one dissident can often be highly
effective, especially when it comes to killing unwanted mergers or other
initiatives. After settling for just one board seat in his fight with Sovereign
Bank, for example, Ralph Whitworth told the Wall Street Journal’s “Heard
on the Street” column that “[v]ocal dissenters can have outsized influences
in clubby corporate boardrooms, essentially exercising veto power over
major strategic decisions such as an acquisition.”254 Sometimes the right
dissident can wind up assuming board leadership.255 Having a big stake
does not hurt, either, and in the right hands can turn into a big stick.256 In
fact, one theoretical study has concluded that truly independent directors
such as those “who own a large block of shares or are employed by a large
shareholder” may actually increase the effectiveness of a board because they
are thereby “shielded from . . . ejection” and the consequent need to accede
to management’s wishes.257
This brings us to the strangest problem. At least some experienced
directors and judges believe that when it comes to board service it helps to
have “skin in the game.”258 If recent scandals such as those involving
ostensible monitor adopts the perspective of the management team being supervised”); Dent,
supra note 166, at 909 (observing that “minority directors usually wind up indistinguishable
from the majority”).
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Enron, Tyco and WorldCom have taught us that “being willing to challenge
company management may be the most crucial qualification for a board
seat,”259 and if having a lot of shares helps foster this kind of independence,
then why do the SEC’s implementing rules under Sarbanes-Oxley
discriminate against board representatives of ten-percent and larger
shareholders?260
But despite these problems, many activist hedge funds continue to seek
board seats. Unlike some of the larger institutional investors, such as on
occasion those associated with governmental entities and unions, they are in
business exclusively to make money all the time. They therefore
presumably believe that they will make more money with board
representation, even minority representation, than without. Otherwise they
would not be activists who seek board seats. In theoretical terms, they
consequently apparently believe that vertical (meaning corporate officers)
and horizontal (meaning the other directors) monitoring and control must be
more efficient and effective from within than from without.261 And to hear
the howls of protest from corporate managements and their lawyers
reviewed in the Introduction,262 they are not the only ones to think so.
V. CONCLUSION
At the end, we are inevitably left with a fundamental question: what is
the meaning of hedge fund activism? This Article has conducted a legal,
empirical, and theoretical study in an effort to develop an answer.
This Article has shown that the SEC opened the door to hedge fund
activism when it got out of the proxy material pre-screening and censorship
business in 1992 and when it adopted the Regulation MA-related “free
communication” Rule 14a-12 in 1999. The recent rise in hedge fund assets,
the increasing difficulties fund managers have had in finding ready-made
investment opportunities for so much money, and the changes in investor
and corporate attitudes following the scandals that led to the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 have all combined to lead hedge funds to walk
saying, “[n]o amount of consultants’ reports or peer review studies can substitute for directors
who have skin in the game”).
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through this open door.
This Article’s empirical survey of hedge fund activism during 2005 and
the 2006 proxy season is notable both for what it found and for what it did
not find. In raw numbers, fewer than 50 hedge fund activism situations
during this period hardly make hedge funds a direct and present threat to
corporate America. But the indirect effects appear to be much greater.
Armed with Rule 14a-12 and evidently undeterred by the threat of becoming
a “group” under the Schedule 13D rules, hedge funds with significant
shareholdings have been able to use wolf-pack tactics against companies to
achieve at least some of their aims. The ovine willingness of institutional
investors to follow the pro-shareholder, pro-activist recommendations of
Institutional Shareholder Services and its competitors have helped make
these tactics still more effective.
Despite claims that hedge funds are frequently dangerously conflicted,
the survey did not find much in the way of a “dark side” to hedge fund
activism. With only one notable exception (Perry at Mylan Labs), adverse
positions and other conflicts appear to have been fully disclosed in the few
instances where they have appeared. Shareholders would seem to have been
really put off by the disclosed conflicts only once (Verizon-MCIDeephaven). Nevertheless, based on the survey, it seems that the proxy and
Schedule 13D rules require clarification so that their line-item disclosure
requirements directly pick up these potential conflicts.
In any event, what hedge funds actually do does not fit neatly into the
“nexus of contracts” and other theories of how shareholders and corporate
managements relate to each other. At least one thing is clear. This Article
would not exist if hedge funds were the powerless, atomized shareholders of
the latter-day Berle and Means theorists or if they were deterred by the welldocumented obstacles to a greater shareholder role in corporate governance.
Hedge fund activists paradoxically practice “shareholder primacy” but
cannot believe in it as a theory lest it empower the large and frequently
conflicted institutional investors such as public pension and union funds
sufficiently to allow them to take a competing seat at the corporate
governance table. There is also a second paradox. Hedge fund activists
must believe in director primacy as an academic theory because it most
accurately describes the current state of the real world and because it helps
justify keeping these kinds of other institutions as far away from the
corporate governance banquet table as possible. But of course as
shareholder activists, they do not for a minute believe in “director primacy”
as a practical matter. Perhaps the best way of thinking about how hedge
fund activists fit into corporate governance today is raw balance-of-power
politics with proxy fights taking the place of warfare. Or to phrase it
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another way, hedge fund activists appear to have finally effected what John
Pound perhaps prematurely predicted over a decade ago: the rise of the
political model of corporate governance.
Hedge fund activists apparently continue to believe that direct board
representation helps them to achieve greater control over their investments
and, presumably, greater profits. On the other side, corporate managements
seem to believe that this kind of effective “control” is not at all an unalloyed
good.
It is too early to say whether hedge fund activism is profitable for the
funds, value-maximizing for other public shareholders, or good for
corporate governance in the United States generally. As for the first point,
the results so far appear somewhat mixed.263 As for the second, the survey
uncovered substantial shareholder skepticism in just one instance. And as
for the third, only time will tell. This Article’s data are too limited for a
definitive answer. But this much seems certain: hedge fund activists do
sometimes come up with “eminently sensible ideas,”264 and the pressure
they bring is forcing managements far beyond those of the few specific
companies directly affected to come up with their own good ideas or, in
Martin Lipton’s words, to “[r]eview basic strategy . . . in light of possible
arguments for spinoffs, share buybacks, special dividends, sale of the
company or other structural changes.”265
Hedge fund activists are not “normal” institutional investors. They
threaten and even actually launch proxy fights for corporate control. They
attack in wolf packs. If this causes managements to reexamine their
businesses and “review basic strategy” accordingly, corporate governance
has unquestionably been improved.

263

See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, In for the Long Haul, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R9
(cautioning that “dissident investors’ enlarged boardroom presence doesn’t always guarantee
better times”); Liz Moyer, High-Impact Activism, FORBES.COM, Feb. 7, 2006, http://www.
Forbes.com/management/2006/02/06/shareholder-activism-redux-x_lm_0207shareholder.html
(noting “mixed success” of some fund managers, and quoting ISS official as saying that “we
may not be able to render a verdict for a while . . . [b]ut it seems like it has been hit or miss”);
Zuckerman, supra note 10, at C3 (noting that it is “hard to quantify the returns from
activism”).
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Der Hovanesian, supra note 3, at 72.

265

Lipton, supra note 174, at 3.

APPENDIX: HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM, JANUARY 2005 - AUGUST 2006

Company

Insurgent

End Date

Principal Issues

Method

Amount Held

Steven Madden

Barrington Capital

2/2/05

Board seats,
governance, sale

13D, 14a-12

7.7%

Circuit City

Highfields Capital

3/7/05

Purchase offer

13D

6.8%

Sears

Lampert

3/25/05

Negotiated sale

Stealth 13G

15.0%

Beverly
Enterprises
Kerr-McGee

Appaloosa,
Formation
Icahn

4/11/05

Sale, board seats

8.1%

4/14/05

Blockbuster

Icahn

5/11/05

Board seats,
enhance value
Board seats,
enhance value

13D, 14a-12,
mailed
13D, 14a-12, HSR
13D, 14a-12, full
contest

9.7%

Cornell
Companies
BioMarin
Pharmaceuticals

Private Capital

5/19/05

13D, 14a-12

OrbiMed Advisors

5/27/05

14.8% + 5% +
7.5%
8.2%

BKF Capital
Group
Mylan Labs

Steel Partners

6/9/05

Icahn

7/18/05

AirNet Systems

Opportunity,
Pacific Coast

7/27/05

Cutter & Buck

Private Capital

9/7/05

Board seats,
governance

Siebel Systems

Tudor, Jana, Icahn

9/12/05

Cenveo

Burton Capital

Register.com

Board seats, sale,
enhance value
Board seats,
enhance value
Board seats,
governance
Board seats,
oppose merger,
Icahn offer letter
Board seats, sale

13D, 14a-12,
mailed, short-slate
rule
13D, 14a-12, full
contest
13D, 14a-12

7.6%

Late 13D (post
hoc by holder)

13D, proxy rules

9.8%

13.3%

Sale

13G, Publicity

9/13/05

Board seats,
enhance value

13D, 14a-12,
mailed

5.7% + 10% misc.
others
10.7%

Barrington Capital
and Mark Cuban

9/15/05

Board seats, sale
price

13D, 14a-12

14.9% + 13.7%

Shopko

John A. Levin &
Co.

9/29/05

Sale price

13D, 14a-12

6.0%

MCI

Deephaven

10/06/05

Sale price

4.9%

Computer
Horizons

Crescendo

10/11/05

Board seats,
oppose merger,
sale

Proxy statement
only, started
mailing
13D, 14a-12, full
contest

1 independent
board seat, stock
buy back
Offer rejected,
stock buy back
Sale to K-Mart
Sale, no board
seats
Buy back, asset
sale, no board seat
3/7 board seats
won

ISS Advice

Legality of
bylaws, by Icahn

3 board seats won,
destaggered board
Offer and proxy
fight dropped,
issuer self-tender
2 board seats, sale
efforts

For merger

Dissidents (2/3)

Dissidents

Terminated pill,
declassified board,
no seats
Sale
7/9 board seats

$500k, Barrington joined buyer;
Cuban objects
$300k, voting
agreement, higher
price
Lost vote but got
higher price
Not significant

5/5 board seats
won, merger
defeated

Comments
Settled

2 board seats + 1
independent

12.5%

10.3%

Result

7/9 board seats

9.5%

13D, special
meeting consent
solicitation
13D

A-1

Litigation

Dissidents

For merger

Management slate,
but oppose merger

CEO later
resigned
Lampert owned
52% of K-Mart
Settled; used wolf
pack tactics
Settled; company
sold in 2006
Board expanded
by 1 to put CEO
back on board
Settled; top 9
holders = 75.7%
Settled

Significant
economic loss
Short in merger
counterparty; vote
buying
Settled; delisted
from NYSE after
sale efforts falter
Settled; top 5
holders had 51%
“Heard on the
Street” in WSJ
Settled; called
special meeting
(had over 10%)
Settled; joint slate
without "group"
filing
Settled; interloper
wins company
Owned bonds,
stock, swaps, short
in others
Bylaws permitted
10% meeting call

Company

Insurgent

End Date

Principal Issues

Method

Alliance SemiConductor
A. Schulman

B. Riley & Co.

10/18/05

Barrington

10/24/05

Exar

GWA Investments

Knight Ridder

Board seats, asset
sales
Board seats, sale

13D, 14a-12,
mailed
13D, 14a-12

11/07/05

Board seats,
governance,
enhance value

14a-12, full
contest

0.7%

Private Capital

11/14/05

Sale

13D

Six Flags

Red Zone

11/22/05

Board seats,
governance, sale

Ligand
Pharmaceuticals

Third Point

12/5/05

Board seats,
maximize value

13D, 14a-12
full consent
solicitation
13D, 14a-12,
preliminary proxy

18.9% + 9% +
8%
11.7%

Office Max

K Capital Partners

4/27/05 and
12/27/05

Sale, governance,
board seat

13D, 14a-12,
started mailing

6.2%; then 8.6%

McDonald's

Pershing Square

1/24/06

Enhance value

Publicity

4.9%

Bally Total
Fitness

Pardus; Liberation

1/26/06

Board seats,
governance,
enhance value

13D, 14a-12, full
contest

14.3% + 12% +
10%

General Motors

Tracinda

2/6/06

Board seat,
Enhance value

13D, HSR

9.9%

Phelps Dodge

Atticus

2/15/06

Maximize value

13D

9.9%

None

Time Warner

Icahn

2/17/06

Board seats,
maximize value

13D, 14a-12 (13D
filed by Icahn
advisee)

5.7%

2 independent
directors, larger
stock buy-back

Wendy's

Trian Fund

3/3/06

Board seats,
enhance value

13D

5.5% + 22% misc.
others

3/15 board seats

Novoste

Steel Partners

3/21/06

Board seats,
oppose liquidation

19.6% + 5.3% +
8.2%

Sovereign Bank

Relational
Investors

3/28/06

Gencorp

Pirate Capital,
Gamco

3/31/06

Board seats,
governance,
oppose merger
Board seats,
governance,
maximize value

13D, full contest
on liq. vote; then
prelim. proxy
13D, 14a-12,
prelim. proxy filed
early
13D, 14a-12, full
contest

Liquidation
defeated;
3/4 seats
1 board seat + 1
independent board
seat
3/10 board seats
won

A-2

Amount Held

Litigation

Result

6.9%

4/7 board seats

8.7%

Self tender, 1
board seat + 1
independent
3/9 board seats
won

9.9%

8.4%

8.4% + 9.9%

ISS Advice
Dissidents (1/5)

Late annual
meeting, by Third
Point

Pill and 13D, state
and federal court

Extensive;
Pennsylvania law
also changed
Suit to avoid Ohio
anti-takeover law,
by dissident

1 independent
board seat, destaggered board
Many restaurants
to be sold
3/9 board seats
won; company
was shopped;
CEO fired
1 board seat,
dividend cut

Settled
Settled

Dissidents

Sale
3/7 board seats
won, de facto
control
3/11 board seats;
maximize value

Comments

Dissidents

Dissident slate

Against liquidation; silent on
board contest

Dissidents (1/3)

“Independence”
listing problems
after win; GWA
was 96% hedged
Proxy fight
threatened
Charter allowed
consent; sale
process fizzles
Settled; top 9
holders had 63%
1st year settled;
2nd year unilateral
exit
Low risk, modest
success
Joint slate with no
group filing or Pill
trigger; owned
debt; 3-way fight
Settled; big 13D
publicity
campaign
Refused board
seat
Settled; 14a-12
war w/o proxy
statement; derivatives issues
Settled; white
paper; wolf pack
tactics; options
Board contest
settled at prelim.
proxy stage
Settled; 14a-12
war with
newspaper ads
Top 7 holders had
48%

Company
Chiron

Insurgent

End Date

Principal Issues

Method

Amount Held

4/03/06

Sale price

13D

5.2% + 11.5%

Reliant Energy

Value Act, CAM
North American
Seneca Capital

4/18/06

Board seats

Publicity

4.0%

Star Gas

Third Point

3/8//05 and
4/28/06

13D

6.2% + 5.3%
+5.4%

Warwick Valley
Telephone

Santa Monica
Partners

4/28/06

Replace CEO;
replace General
Partner
Board seats,
maximize value

13D, full contest

2.4%

Yardville Bank

Seidman entities

5/3/06

Board seats,
maximize value

13D, full contest

8.3%

Massey Energy

Third Point

5/16/06

Dolphin

5/26/06

13D, 14a-12, full
contest
14a-12, full
contest

5.9%

InfoUSA

Life Point
Hospitals

Accipter

5/30/06

Board seats,
maximize value
Board seats,
governance,
maximize value
Board seats

14a-12, mailed

1.8%

SCPIE Holdings

Stillwell

6/22/06

Jana

6/27/06

CD Capital,
Chapman Capital,
Third Point
Pembridge,
Crescendo

7/26/06

13D, 14a-12, full
contest
13D, notice of exempt solicitation
13D

7.3%

Houston
Exploration
Sunterra

Board seats,
enhance value
Purchase offer,
maximize value
Sale, governance,
board seat

6/13/05 and
7/28/06

Pep Boys

Barrington, Pirate

8/03/06

Directors,
governance,
maximize value
Board seats, sale

13D, 14a-12, full
contest settled on
meeting day
13D, 14a-12

9.9% + 8.3%

Acxiom

ValueAct

10/27/05 and
8/07/06

13D, 14a-12,
Preliminary proxy

10.4% ;
then 11.9%

Heinz

Trian

8/16/06

Purchase offer;
board seats, governance, enhance
value
Board seats,
governance,
enhance value

13D, 14a-12, short
slate rule, full
contest

5.5%

Topps

A-3

3.6%

Litigation

Result
$45 offer raised to
$48
1 independent to
be named by
company
CEO and General
Partner replaced

Untimely
nomination, by
dissident
Nominee
qualification, by
dissident
Post-hoc vote
counting
Books and
records, by
dissident
Untimely
nomination, by
dissident
Shareholder list,
by dissident

ISS Advice
ISS also said $45
was low

Lost vote

Comments
Good result for
minimal effort
Settled; 14a-9
made company
disclose campaign
Two seasons; two
other hedge funds
filed 13Gs
Hired banker for
strategic alternatives afterwards
Bylaw disqualified
Seidman himself

Lost vote

Management

Won both board
seats sought
Lost vote (moral
victory only)

Dissidents (1/2)

Cumulative voting

Dissidents

CEO had 40%;
use of books &
records “dirt”
Nomination was
too late

Management

No insurance industry experience
Only “notice”
filing in data base
Delisted, CEO
fired for cause,
SEC investigation
1st year settled;
2nd yr. settled for
all 3 seats sought
Settled, CEO quit,
delayed meeting
Offer failed; then
settled proxy
contest

Dropped

Lost vote

12.8%

Value efforts

6.8% + 8.4% +
9.8%

1 board seat, sale
efforts

7.4%

$50k, value efforts
1st year; 2nd year
3/10 board seats
$200k, 4/10 board
Seats
Offer rejected;
2/11 board seats,
stock buy-back

Dissidents

2/12 board seats
won + 2 independents

Dissidents (3/5)

Dueling contest
web sites, much
publicity

